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Parsing the daily stream of activity into situations is essential for adaptive 
functioning in everyday life. Central to this imperative is the question of how people 
form and modify their mental representation of a situation. Across several literatures (i.e., 
social psychology, engineering psychology, and narrative comprehension), we identified 
a number of points of agreement about the properties of our mental representations of 
situations. We argue that Event Segmentation Theory (EST) provides a framework for 
understanding how these properties coalesce to give rise to our representations of 
situations.  
The goal of the present studies was to understand how the cognitive mechanisms 
of EST might account for one property in particular - the hierarchical structure of our 
representations of situations. According to EST, people maintain a hierarchy of “event 
models” of ongoing activity in working memory, which represent events unfolding 
simultaneously on different timescales. Event models continually try to predict the near 
future and are updated in response to prediction error. Updating an event model gives rise 
to our perception of a “boundary” between events and is what people report during event 
segmentation tasks. EST posits that the hierarchy of event models in working memory 
arises from the differential predictive accuracies of coarse-event models (e.g., of 
situations) and fine-event models (e.g., of shorter events occurring within situations). 
We tested this hypothesis by orienting participants to their event models of the 
situations or of the fine events in a narrative film, either by having them indicate each 
time a new situation or a new fine event began. Throughout the film, we also assessed 
xii 
 
their confidence and predictive accuracy at moments when both variables should depend 
on the event model being interrogated. Across two studies, we obtained novel support for 
the general mechanisms of EST but converging evidence that participants only 
maintained fine-event models of activity, even though we found that their segmentation 
of the film depended on their orientation. We propose that the fine-grained segmentation 
of activity may reflect the updating of fine-event models whereas coarser-grained 
segmentation may instead reflect how people group fine events online, rather than the 








CHAPTER 1.       INTRODUCTION 
 
Our daily lives are a continuously unfolding stream of activity. We make sense of 
this stream by parsing it into discrete, meaningful units (Kurby & Zacks, 2008; Zacks, 
Speer, Swallow, Braver, & Reynolds, 2007; Zacks & Tversky, 2001). Parsing the activity 
stream into different situations is essential for adaptive functioning (Rauthmann & 
Sherman, 2016). For example, if a driver is caught unexpectedly in a downpour, the 
driver ought to recognize that he or she should not continue driving in the same manner 
as before the downpour began. Similarly, if a stranger, who stopped you to ask for 
directions, suddenly produces a knife, one ought to recognize that continuing to give the 
stranger directions is no longer the most appropriate behavior in the situation. In both 
examples, it is important that one perceives that a new situation has begun; otherwise, 
continuing one’s behavior from the previous situation would be maladaptive. The 
consequences of failing to recognize the advent of a new situation are as varied as the 
situations in which we may find ourselves – from those in fictional worlds of narrative 
text and film, to the mundane (e.g., a surprise birthday party), to those where life itself 
hangs in the balance (e.g., flying an airplane through a lightning storm). 
The present studies attempt to understand how we divide ongoing activity into 
different situations through the framework of Event Segmentation Theory (EST; Zacks et 
al., 2007). EST offers a mechanistic account of how and why people segment continuous 
activity into discrete events, from those lasting seconds (e.g., eating a strawberry or 
pouring coffee into a cup) to those lasting tens of minutes (e.g., washing dishes or talking 
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on the phone with a friend; Kurby & Zacks, 2008; Zacks et al., 2007). EST explains the 
segmentation of activity in terms of the mental representations people have of events (i.e., 
“event models”; Radvansky, 2012) and the cognitive processes that form and modify 
these representations (Radvansky & Zacks, 2017). Consequently, it is important to 
demonstrate how this framework relates to the nature and construction of the mental 
representations people form of situations per se.  
To this end, the following sections provide a focused and integrated review of 
three literatures in psychology that have each examined the nature of our mental 
representations of situations – social (and personality) psychology, engineering 
psychology, and narrative comprehension. Although they share a common interest in the 
representations of situations, each literature is concerned with different kinds of 
situations; research in narrative comprehension is largely concerned with how people 
understand situations described in stories. On the other hand, research in social and 
engineering psychology is concerned with how people understand the situations of which 
they are a part, with engineering psychology focusing on situations that arise in 
sociotechnical systems (e.g., an airplane cockpit or a nuclear power plant control room). 
Despite the fact that these literatures operate largely independently of each other, we have 
identified many points of agreement about the properties of our representations of 
situations that we believe coalesce within the framework of EST. In the following 
sections, we will discuss each point of agreement and in turn, demonstrate how EST 




1.1 Dualism and Correspondence 
Each literature acknowledges a dualism comprising the external situation and the 
internal representation of the situation (i.e., there is a difference between what is “out 
there” and what is “in the head”). In social and personality psychology, for example, the 
study of situations and their effect(s) on people typically assumes either an “objective” 
view of situations, which emphasizes objectively quantifiable situational information 
(e.g., people, objects, or locations), or a “subjective” view of situations, which 
emphasizes the evaluative characteristics that people ascribe to the objective situation 
(e.g., “positive” or “adverse”; Furr & Funder, 2004; Rauthmann, Sherman, & Funder, 
2015). Recently, Rauthmann and colleagues have advanced a model of situation 
perception that is compatible with both perspectives; perceivers arrive at a mental 
representation of a situation only after selecting, filtering, evaluating, and interpreting 
objectively measurable features of the external situation (e.g., the persons or objects 
present) via implicit (i.e., quick and effortless) and explicit (i.e., slow and deliberate) 
information processing (Rauthmann, 2012; Rauthmann et al., 2015; Rauthmann, 2016). 
The resulting mental representation reflects the psychologically meaningful or 
consequential characteristics of the external situation (e.g., its positivity or adversity). 
Relatedly, research in engineering psychology is often aimed at an individual 
operator’s understanding of a dynamically changing environment (i.e., their “situation 
awareness”; Durso & Sethumadhavan, 2008). Methods for assessing an operator’s 
situation awareness in a dynamic environment (i.e., query-based techniques; Durso, 
Truitt, Hackworth, Crutchfield, & Manning, 1995; Endsley, 1990) assume that there is a 
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“… ‘ground truth’ against which its accuracy can be assessed (e.g. the objective state of 
the world or the objective unfolding of events that are predicted),” (Parasuraman, 
Sheridan, & Wickens, 2008, p. 144; van Winsen, Henriqson, Schuler, & Dekker, 2015).  
Lastly, when understanding the unfolding events in a narrative text, readers form 
a non-linguistic representation of the situation described in the text (i.e., a “situation 
model”; Bransford, Barclay, & Franks, 1972; van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983; Glenberg, 
Meyer, & Lindem, 1987; Kintsch, 1988; Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998). As a mental 
representation, the situation model is distinct from but coordinated with the reader’s 
“surface-level” representation of the specific words in a text and their syntactic relations 
as well as the “text base,” which is a propositional representation of the semantic or 
conceptual information contained within the sentence. 
Each literature also recognizes the close relationship between psychological 
outcomes (e.g., affect, cognition, or behavior) and the correspondence (or isomorphism) 
between the external situation and internal situation. For example, Dekker and Lutzhoft 
(2004) observed that virtually all theories of situation awareness (SA) agree that a high 
correspondence between the external situation and one’s representation of it equates to 
good SA whereas a low correspondence equates to poor SA (e.g., Bedny & Meister, 
1999; Endsley, 1995; Flach, 1996; Sarter & Woods, 1991; Smith & Hancock, 1995). 
When an operator “loses” his or her situation awareness of a safety-critical environment 
(e.g., in the driver’s seat, an airplane cockpit, or an operating room), the operator 
becomes more vulnerable to error and performance failures, which can carry devastating 
consequences (Durso & Alexander, 2010; Durso & Sethumadhavan, 2008).  
5 
 
Similarly, theories of narrative comprehension argue that successfully 
understanding a narrative is equivalent to forming a coherent model of the situations 
described in the text (van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983; Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998; Zwaan, 
Radvansky, Hilliard, & Curiel, 1998). Indeed, reading interventions that target situation 
model updating (e.g., teaching readers to explicitly monitor discontinuities in the features 
of situations) improves general reading comprehension ability relative to a standard 
reading comprehension curriculum (Wassenberg, Bos, de Koning, van der Schoot, 2015 
but see Bohn-Gettler, 2014). Moreover, there have also been explicit attempts in 
engineering psychology to leverage situation model theory in dynamic environments 
(e.g., to facilitate information search in air traffic control, Durso, Johnson, & Crutchfield, 
2010; Durso, Rawson, & Girotto, 2007). 
1.1.1 Event Segmentation Theory 
EST also posits that our representations of activity guide our cognition and 
behavior, the fitness of which depends on the correspondence between our 
representations and the external world. Specifically, EST proposes that our perception of 
ongoing activity is guided by event models in working memory that represent “what is 
happening now,” (e.g., making breakfast or fluffing a pillow; Zacks et al., 2007, p. 274). 
Specifically, event models represent the entities involved in an event (e.g., objects and 
people), properties of those entities (e.g., their physical characteristics or goals), the 
spatial-temporal context within which an event occurs, and the structural relations 
between entities in an event as well as the causal or temporal relationship(s) among a 
chain of events (Radvansky & Zacks, 2011; Radvansky & Zacks, 2014). 
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Just as the correspondence between the external and internal situation matters for 
psychological outcomes, the degree of correspondence between ongoing activity and 
one’s segmentation of it is also important. In the event segmentation literature, 
“correspondence” is operationalized as the extent to which an individual segments an 
activity in a normative, rather than idiosyncratic, manner (i.e., tending to identify the 
same boundaries that other observers identify). For example, the more normatively one 
segments a range of everyday activities, the better he or she is at recognizing and 
recalling the temporal order of events from the same activities (Zacks, Speer, Vettel, & 
Jacoby, 2006) or from different activities (Kurby & Zacks, 2011). Moreover, Bailey, 
Kurby, Giovannetti, and Zacks (2013) found that the ability to segment everyday 
activities (e.g., making breakfast) in a normative manner was also positively related to the 
ability to efficiently perform a different set of everyday activities (e.g., packing a 
backpack with school supplies), even after controlling for relevant cognitive variables 
such as working memory capacity, semantic memory, and script knowledge. 
1.2 Situations are Bounded 
That we recognize when the current situation ends and a new situation begins 
implies that situations can be demarcated, and thus bounded, in time. Indeed, the bounded 
nature of situations is reflected by the fact that we reason and talk about situations as 
coherent entities (Edwards & Templeton, 2005; Rauthmann et al., 2014). For example, 
people reliably sort descriptions of everyday situations (e.g., “Having a drink with some 
friends in a pub,” or “Going to the bank,”; Forgas, 1976) into groups based on their 
perceived similarity to each other (e.g., Battistich & Thompson, 1980; Forgas, 1976; 
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Magnusson, 1971; Yang, Read, & Miller, 2006) as can professional air traffic controllers 
when given pictures of radar displays and flight strips depicting different air traffic 
situations (Neissen, Eyferth, & Bierwagen, 1999).  
Moreover, we spontaneously form impressions of situations and describe them 
with adjectives such as “pleasurable,” “productive,” or “bad,” (Edwards & Templeton, 
2005). In fact, our vocabulary for describing situations appears to be structured such that 
we can systematically differentiate one situation from another. For example, Parrigon, 
Woo, Tay, and Wang (2017) performed the largest-to-date lexical analysis of the 
characteristics of situations, having participants rate how well 851 different adjectives 
described a variety of everyday situations. Parrigon et al. (2017) concluded that our 
vocabulary for describing situations varies along seven dimensions, with each dimension 
reflecting a different characteristic of situations - Complexity (“How complex or intricate 
is the situation?”), Adversity (“How difficult or depleting is the situation?”), Positive 
Valence (“How positively charged is the situation?”), Typicality (“How common and 
straightforward, or novel and ambiguous, is the situation?”), Importance (“How well will 
the situation lead to the attainment of one’s goals?”), Humor (“How humorous or 
lighthearted is the situation?”), and Negative Valence (“How negatively charged is the 
situation?”). 
Lastly, like other kinds of bounded entities (e.g., objects; Rosch, 1999), situations 
can be described at different levels of abstraction; for example, an ottoman is a kind of 
chair, which in turn is a kind of furniture. Regarding situations, “Going to the dentist for 
a root canal treatment,” and “Coming too late to a buffet and all the food is gone,” are 
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each a kind of “negative situation” (Rauthmann, 2016, p. 95). Indeed, there have been a 
number of efforts to create a taxonomy of situations in terms of the groups, clusters, or 
classes of situations (see Rauthmann, 2015 or Yang, Read, & Miller, 2009 for a review). 
For example, van Heck (1984, 1989) produced a prominent taxonomy of situation classes 
(Parrigon et al., 2017; Ten Berge & de Raad, 1999; Rauthmann et al., 2014), which 
comprises interpersonal conflict, joint working and information exchange, intimacy and 
interpersonal relations, recreation, traveling, rituals, sport, excesses, serving, and trading 
situations. 
Research on the comprehension of described situations also suggests that we 
represent situations as bounded entities. The situation models that readers form of 
narrative text are presumably enclosed in a spatial-temporal framework, within which a 
single or a series of story events unfold (Radvansky & Dijkstra, 2007; Radvansky & 
Wyer, 1999). Different events occurring within the same spatial-temporal framework 
(e.g., while watching a movie in a movie theater) are represented as parts of the same 
situation. However, events that occur within different spatial-temporal frameworks are 
represented in different situations models (Radvansky & Zacks, 1991; Radvansky, 
Zwaan, Federico, & Franklin, 1998). During reading, for example, information appearing 
just prior to a large temporal discontinuity (e.g., “a day later.”) is less accessible than 
when the same information appears before a small temporal discontinuity (e.g., “a 
moment later,”; Radvansky, Copeland, Berish, & Dijkstra, 2003; Zwaan, 1996). A large 
temporal discontinuity likely signifies the start of a new situation, requiring that the 
reader establish a new situation model, whereas a small discontinuity likely indicates a 
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continuation of the same situation, requiring that the reader integrate the new event with 
the current situation model. Indeed, the cognitive effort required to establish a new 
situation model is reflected in longer reading times for sentences describing a large 
versus small temporal discontinuity. Similar results have obtained following spatial 
discontinuities (e.g., moving to a new and distinct location; Morrow, Greenspan, & 
Bower, 1987; Rinck & Bower, 2000; Rinck, Hähnel, Bower, & Glowalla, 1997; Zwaan et 
al., 1998), although reading time is not consistently affected as readers appear to be facile 
at updating along the spatial dimension (Radvansky & Copeland, 2010). Lastly, 
Radvansky (2005) argues that readers create a single situation model of multiple 
sentences if they all describe a common situation, but otherwise, create separate situation 
models of each sentence. For example, “The potted palm is in the hotel,” “The potted 
palm is in the museum,” and “The potted palm is in the barber shop,” refer to three 
different situations whereas, “The welcome mat is in the laundromat,” “The pay phone is 
in the laundromat,” and “The oak counter is in the laundromat,” all refer to a single 
common situation. After memorizing these sentences, verifying that “The potted palm is 
in the hotel,” is more difficult than “The welcome mat is in the laundromat,” because 
there are presumably three competing (i.e., interfering) situation models involving a 
potted palm but only one situation model involving a welcome mat. 
1.2.1 Event Segmentation Theory 
That we perceive boundaries between contiguous situations makes situations 
similar to the “events” examined in the event cognition literature. According to EST, 
events are “…a segment of time at a given location that is conceived by an observer to 
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have a beginning and an end,” (Zacks & Tversky, 2001, p. 17) and comprise goal-
directed human activities lasting from seconds to tens of minutes. In this sense, situations 
are those events that extend farther in time than events such as basic actions (e.g., 
reaching or pushing) or more complex composite events (e.g., greeting a friend or 
ordering from a restaurant menu). However, situations are briefer than events like a 
baseball game or a wedding reception, which comprise a series of distinct, but related 
situations. Thus, situations fall somewhere between these extremes as “… momentary 
and fleeting phenomena that dynamically flow into each other,” (Rauthmann & Sherman, 
2016, p. 3) yet also have discernable boundaries in time and space. 
To measure the segmentation of ongoing activity, Newtson (1973) devised a “unit 
marking” procedure in which participants watched a video of an actor performing a 
sequence of behaviors (e.g., filling out a questionnaire, lighting a cigarette, throwing out 
a match, and so forth). Before watching the video, participants were instructed to mark 
off the behavior of the actor into either the smallest units that seemed natural and 
meaningful (i.e., fine-grained segmentation) or into the largest units that seemed natural 
and meaningful (i.e., coarse-grained segmentation) by pressing a button. Newtson (1973) 
found that participants reliably varied the size of their units of perception, producing 
more fine-grained than coarse-grained units, and that consensual coarse-grained 
breakpoints tended to be a subset of consensual fine-grained breakpoints.  
Later, Newtson and Engquist (1976) found that breakpoints identified in the unit 
marking procedure formed the boundaries of coherent perceptual units. Specifically, 
participants were better at detecting deletions of breakpoints than non-breakpoints from 
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films, were more accurate at describing actions when viewing slides of only breakpoints 
versus slides of only non-breakpoints and had better recognition memory for breakpoints 
than non-breakpoints in films. More recently, Hard, Recchia, and Tversky (2011) found 
that participants looked longer at breakpoints than non-breakpoints when viewing 
slideshows of everyday activities at their own pace, and that looking time at coarse 
breakpoints, but not overall looking time, predicted the number of actions they could later 
recall.  
1.3 Situations are Hierarchical 
The boundaries between situations punctuate a dynamically unfolding series of 
events. Taking a similar view in social psychology, Forgas (1976) conceptualized 
situations as “social episodes” which he defined as “… interaction sequences which 
constitute natural units in the stream of behavior … [that] are distinguishable on the basis 
of symbolic, temporal, and often physical boundaries,” (Forgas, 1976, p. 81). Indeed, 
when people recall and freely describe a situation they encountered recently, their 
descriptions often refer to episodes of activity; for example, “ Playing chess,” “Going to 
the bank,” “Visiting your doctor,” (Forgas, 1976, p. 85), “On a date with your 
boy/girlfriend,” “Listening to a lecture in class,” “Cleaning your room/house alone,” 
(Battistich & Thompson, 1980, p. 77), “At the supermarket,” “Going window shopping,” 
“Having breakfast,” (Eckes, 1995, p. 369), “Playing games at a friend’s apartment,” 
“Making dinner for me and my boyfriend,” or “…watching TV,” (Sherman, Nave, & 
Funder, 2010, p. 337). Thus, it seems natural for people to think of situations as episodes 
(i.e., a series of events bookended by situation boundaries). 
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In dynamic environments, Deutsch, Pew, Rogers, and Tenney (1994) observed 
that events, either externally driven or produced by an operator, occur within situations. 
Indeed, maintaining adequate SA requires that one recognize and integrate a series of 
events over time (Durso, Bleckley, & Dattel, 2007; Sarter & Woods, 1999; Woods, 
1988), particularly when relying on SA to diagnose the cause of or prevent a problematic 
situation from arising. From several studies of highly skilled teams of NASA flight 
controllers, Christoffersen, Woods, and Blick (2007, p. 83) observed that “…event 
descriptions were found to be a highly prominent feature of the communication 
exchanged between flight controllers during monitoring, diagnosis, and replanning 
following anomalies,” suggesting that flight controllers naturally conceive of system 
perform in terms of events. Moreover, Flach, Bennet, Jagacinski, Mulder, and van Passen 
(2004) observed that pilots describe poor SA as the inability to see how events cohere or 
connect to one another. Flach et al. (2004) argue that situations can be decomposed and 
described hierarchically at different levels of abstraction (e.g., from individual actions, 
such as a pilot adjusting the throttle, to the pilot’s overall goal, such as landing safely). 
When the relations between the levels of abstraction are unclear, there is no longer a basis 
for decomposing activity into coherent chunks, rendering one’s SA poor. 
Finally, each literature agrees that our representations of situations are built from 
our knowledge of the world. Forgas (1982) argued that the representations of social 
episodes are rooted in the scripts or schemata that people form of the everyday, routine 
situations within their cultural milieu. Indeed, people across the adult lifespan largely 
agree on the basic sequence of actions that comprise routine situations (e.g., shopping at 
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the grocery store or eating at a restaurant; Rosen, Caplan, Sheesley, Rodriguez, & 
Grafman, 2005) and how those basic actions are chunked to form larger meaningful units 
of activity (Bower, Black, & Turner, 1979). For example, most people agree that getting 
ready for work comprises turning off the alarm, waking up, getting out of bed, going to 
the bathroom, and so on (Rosen et al., 2005). Having structured representations of 
situations imparts a “… sense of coherence and stability and a hierarchical structure to 
the otherwise complex and confusing ebb and flow of social life,” (Forgas, 1982, p. 68). 
These representations, in turn, have important consequences for cognition. For example, 
Flores, Bailey, Eisenberg, and Zacks (2017) observed that when people recall information 
from descriptions or depictions of routine activity, their responses are more likely to 
contain information that is directly related (rather than unrelated) to their pre-existing 
scripts for that activity and to organize their responses around (or distort the order of 
events to fit) their scripts (e.g., Abbott, Black, & Smith, 1985; Bartlett, 1932; Bower et 
al., 1979; Bower & Clark-Meyers, 1980; Brewer & Dupree, 1983; Lichtenstein & 
Brewer, 1980; Migueles & García-Bajos, 2012). 
Lastly, situation models of dynamic environments are also believed to derive from 
“mental models,” which are long-term memory structures that represent the causal and 
functional relations between the elements in a system (e.g., a nuclear power plant; Doane, 
Sohn, & Jodlowski, 2004; Durso et al., 2007; Durso & Gronlund, 1999; Endsley, 2000). 
A similar idea can be found in narrative comprehension; because narratives rarely 
describe situations completely nor cohesively, readers must often make inferences by 
drawing upon their knowledge to create a coherent situation model (Graesser, Singer, & 
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Trabasso, 1994). In this sense, situation models in narrative comprehension are 
amalgamations of information stated directly in the text and information summoned from 
the reader’s knowledge (Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998); similarly, situation models of 
dynamic environments are amalgamations of information in the environment and the 
operator’s knowledge base (Durso & Gronlund, 1999). 
1.3.1 Event Segmentation Theory 
That people perceive, conceive, and remember activity in a hierarchical fashion 
are among the key phenomena that EST strives to explain. EST claims that we maintain 
event models for different timescales simultaneously in working memory, although 
observers may selectively attend to event models for a specific timescale (e.g., fine or 
coarse-grained segmentation; Radvansky & Zacks, 2014). For example, when activity is 
coherent and hierarchically structured, observers can choose whether to attend to their 
fine- or coarse-grained event models (e.g., depending on their goals or task instructions, 
Zacks et al., 2007). However, when activity is less coherent and difficult to organize into 
coarse-grained units, perceivers may be forced to parse activity only at a fine-grained 
level. For example, observers tend to segment an activity more frequently when they 
cannot decipher an agent’s goals (Hard, Tversky, & Lang, 2006; Newtson 1973; Wilder, 
1978a; Wilder, 1978b) than when an agent’s goal(s) are clear. Moreover, observers 
segment an activity less frequently as their familiarity with that activity increases, either 
through repeated exposure in the laboratory (Hard et al., 2006) or previous exposure 
within the domain from which the activity comes (e.g., expert-novice differences; 
Bläsing, 2015). Regarding the latter, professional dancers segmented a dance phrase into 
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larger units than did non-dancers and moreover, amateur dancers segmented the same 
dance phrase into larger units after learning how to perform it than before learning it. 
Zacks et al. (2001) were the first to demonstrate that within observers, events are 
perceived on multiple timescales such that fine-grained events are grouped within coarse-
grained events. Zacks et al. (2001) had participants segment videos of everyday activities 
(e.g., making a bed once) twice, once under fine- and then under coarse-grained 
instructions (in a counterbalanced order). While segmenting, half of the participants also 
described each event that they perceived. Zacks et al. (2001) demonstrated hierarchical 
alignment of coarse and fine unit boundaries using both a discrete measure of alignment 
(based on co-occurrence of coarse and fine unit boundaries in 1-second time bins) as well 
as a continuous measure of alignment (based on the mean temporal distance between 
coarse and fine boundaries). Moreover, the hierarchical relationship between coarse and 
fine units was also apparent in how participants described events. For example, 
descriptions of coarse units tended to differ with respect to the object of interaction (e.g., 
a bed sheet versus a blanket) whereas descriptions of fine units within the same coarse 
unit differed with respect to the action performed on the object (e.g., unfolding versus 
straightening a bed sheet). Furthermore, of all the fine units within a coarse unit, 
descriptions of fine units nearest the boundaries of coarse units were most similar to the 
description of the overall coarse unit. The hierarchical alignment of coarse and fine unit 
boundaries within observers has since been replicated when segmenting videos of 
naturalistic activity (e.g., Kurby & Zacks, 2011; Sargent et al., 2013; Zacks, Kumar, 
Abrams, & Mehta, 2009; Zacks, Speer, Swallow, & Maley, 2010; Zacks, Speer, & 
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Reynolds, 2009; Zacks, Swallow, Vettel, & McAvoy, 2006), abstract geometric 
animations depicting intentional or randomly generated activity (e.g., Hard et al., 2006; 
Zacks, 2004), and narrative text (e.g., Kurby & Zacks, 2012; Zacks et al., 2009). In 
summary, the hierarchical structure of activity is a central and highly replicable 
characteristic of event segmentation both between and within observers. 
Segmenting activity hierarchically is not merely something people can do when 
instructed, but rather, it appears to be a normal part of ongoing perception. In support, 
Zacks et al. (2001) used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to scan the brains 
of participants while they watched short videos of everyday activities (e.g., making a bed; 
Zacks et al., 2001) three times each; during the first scan, participants passively watched 
the video without knowing that they would later segment it. During the second and third 
scans, participants pressed a button to segment the video into coarse or fine units. Zacks 
et al. (2001) found that brain regions (involved in attention-shifting and motion-
processing) showed similar patterns of activity at event boundaries, regardless if someone 
was actively segmenting or passively watching the film. These findings have since been 
replicated using videos of simple geometric animations (Zacks, Swallow, Vettel, & 
McAvoy, 2006), extended naturalistic activity (i.e., the narrative film; Zacks et al., 2010), 
and narrative descriptions of everyday activity (Speer, Zacks, & Reynolds, 2007), which 
suggests that the segmentation of activity occurs automatically, regardless of whether 
activity is observed or described. Moreover, a common finding across these studies (c.f. 
Zacks et al., 2010) is that brain responses are generally larger at coarse- than fine-grained 
boundaries (Kurby & Zacks, 2018; Speer et al., 2007; Zacks et al., 2001; Zacks et al., 
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2006), suggesting that neural activity is modulated by the hierarchical structure of events 
(Zacks et al., 2001). 
 More recently, Baldassano et al. (2017) took a data-driven approach to identify 
event boundaries a priori as shifts between stable patterns of activity in regions 
throughout the brain. Baldassano et al. (2017) had subjects passively watch a 50-minute 
narrative film while having their brains scanned and later, applied a Hidden Markov 
Model to identify transitions, or boundaries, between stable patterns of cortical activity. 
Transitions separated by seconds in low-level sensory cortices (e.g., early and late visual 
areas) were hierarchically aligned with transitions separated by minutes in higher-order 
cognitive areas (e.g., those involved in episodic memory and tasks requiring the use of 
situation models; Ranganath & Ritchey, 2012). Lastly, Baldassano et al. (2017) also 
compared the boundaries extracted from the imaging data to the boundaries between 
“scenes” identified by a separate group of participants, finding that overt segmentation of 
the film aligned more closely with the coarser- than the finer-grained boundaries 
extracted from the imaging data. 
EST posits that the hierarchical structure of event segmentation reflects the 
hierarchical structure of event knowledge (Hard et al., 2006). Event models in working 
memory are believed to be tokens of event schemata, which are structured representations 
in long-term memory of routine activities (e.g., making breakfast, eating at a restaurant, 
or doing the laundry; Shank & Abelson, 1977). While processing ongoing activity, event 
models predict the near future based on what has happened recently as well as 
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information gleaned from event schemata (e.g., about how a sequence of events might 
unfold). 
Studies that have allowed people to segment at a preferred or natural grain have 
consistently found knowledge effects despite the fact that knowledge has been 
manipulated in different ways, such as having knowledge about an actor’s goals 
(Newberry & Bailey, 2019; Newtson, 1973; Wilder, 1978a, Wilder, 1978b), comparing 
domain experts with novices (Bläsing, 2015, Levine, Hirsh-Pasek, Pace, & Golinkoff, 
2017; Markus, Smith, & Moreland, 1985), or having prior knowledge about an actor or 
events (Graziano, Moore, & Collins, 1988; Massad, Hubbard, & Newtson, 1979). A 
common result across studies using “natural” segmentation instructions is that having 
knowledge of some kind enables one to parse activity into larger units, relative to having 
no or less knowledge. 
However, evidence that event knowledge is related to the hierarchical structure of 
online event segmentation is somewhat inconsistent. For example, Zacks et al. (2001) 
found that the hierarchical alignment of coarse and fine event boundaries increased the 
more familiar an observer was with an activity (e.g., assembling a saxophone) and also 
when an observer described the activity while segmenting it, which presumably 
encouraged the use of knowledge in justifying one’s decisions. Neither of these results, 
however, have since replicated (Hard et al., 2006; Zacks & Kurby, 2011). Moreover, 
Sargent et al. (2013) found that a measure of script knowledge was positively related to 
the normativeness of one’s segmentation, but not significantly so. Thus, knowledge 
clearly influences online event segmentation, but its effect(s) is difficult to detect when 
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observers must explicitly segment activity into small and large units (i.e., hierarchically, 
but see Swallow, Kemp, & Simsek, 2018). 
1.4 Situations are Multifaceted 
Across the literatures, there is consensus that our representations of situations are 
multifaceted and moreover, there is convergence in terms of what those facets are. 
Research on situations as experienced (i.e., in social and personality psychology) and 
situations as described or depicted (i.e., in narrative comprehension) appear to agree on 
the basic features of our representations of situations; Who or what is present, what is 
happening, when and where is the situation happening, and why is this happening (Johns, 
2006; Parrigon et al. 2017; Rauthmann, Sherman, & Funder, 2015; Saucier, Bel-Bahar, & 
Fernandez, 2007)? These categories of situational information have collectively been 
called “situation cues” (Rauthmann, 2015) and are known to constitute the mental 
representations people form of described situations (van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983; Zwaan & 
Radvansky, 1998). When these features of situations change in a story, readers tend to 
update their current situation model to reflect the altered situation, which is evidenced by 
increases in processing time (i.e., reading time; Bailey, Kurby, Sargent, & Zacks, 2017; 
Rinck & Weber, 2003; Zacks et al., 2009; Zwaan, Magliano, Graesser, 1995; Zwaan, 
Radvansky, Hilliard, & Curiel, 1998) as well as reduced accessibility of information that 
appeared just prior to a change (Bailey et al., 2017; Ditman, Holcomb, & Kuperberg, 
2008; Glenberg et al., 1987; Morrow, Greenspan, & Bower, 1987; Radvansky & 
Copeland, 2010; Rinck & Bower, 2000; Speer & Zacks, 2005; Zwaan, 1996; Zwaan, 
Madden, & Whitten, 2000). Outside of narrative text, changes in situation cues in virtual 
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reality environments (e.g., spatial location; Radvansky & Copeland, 2006; Radvansky, 
Tamplin, & Krawietz, 2010) and narrative films also produce situation model updating 
effects (Huff, Meitz, & Papenmeier, 2014; Magliano, Miller, & Zwaan, 2001), suggesting 
that models of narrative comprehension may be generalizable to the mental 
representations of everyday experiences (Radvansky & Zacks, 2011). 
However, researchers in social and personality psychology (e.g., Edwards & 
Templeton, 2005) recognize that our representations of situations also reflect the 
“characteristics” of a situation (e.g., positive, social, effortful, or sexual; Rauthmann, 
2015; Rauthmann et al., 2015), which are believed to be interpretations or evaluations of 
the meaning of a constellation of situation cues (i.e., the gestalt; Pervin, 1978). For 
example, situations perceived as “positive” are more likely to contain friends [Who?] 
than situations containing working or studying [What?] (Rauthmann et al., 2014). 
Furthermore, two people can be exposed to the same set of situation cues but differ in the 
specific qualities they ascribe to the overall situation (e.g., is the situation threatening or 
is it enjoyable?), which can arise from how observers differentially attend to and evaluate 
situation cues (e.g., due to different personality traits, moods, or goals; Rauthmann et al., 
2015). Of note, Rauthmann and Sherman (2018) observed that five replicable situation 
characteristics have emerged across recent large-scale independent research efforts; these 
characteristics describe the extent to which a situation affords or requires either 1) 
overcoming external threats and obstacles, 2) dealing with internal negative events that 
may cause distress, 3) getting an important or urgent task accomplished, 4) using deeper 
and effortful cognitive processing, or 5) engaging with fun and pleasant events. 
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 In engineering psychology, several researchers have lamented a lack of 
understanding about what differentiates one situation from another (Flach, 1995; Flach et 
al., 2004; Tenney & Pew, 2006). Indeed, the kinds of information reflected in an 
operator’s model of a situation tend to be domain-specific (e.g., a patient’s vital signs are 
relevant to an anesthesiologist whereas altitude and heading are relevant to a pilot), 
making generalization across situations difficult. However, Durso et al. (2007) argued 
that models of narrative comprehension, which have categorized the situational 
information that readers routinely monitor, may also serve as a model of situation 
awareness in dynamic environments. In particular, the Event-Indexing Model (Zwaan & 
Radvansky, 1998) posits that situation models primarily represent the events described in 
a narrative (Radvansky & Copeland, 2010; Rinck & Weber, 2003; Zwann, Langston, & 
Graesser, 1995; Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998), such as a “… a raindrop falling, an 
explosion, or someone tripping over a cat,” (Zwaan, 1999, p. 95). For each event, readers 
construct an index for when the event occurred (e.g., a moment or a day later), where in 
space it occurred, why it occurred (i.e., the physical or motivational cause of the event), 
and who or what was involved in the event (e.g., characters or objects). Indeed, Durso et 
al. (2010) found that information sought by operators monitoring dynamic real-word 
situations overlaps with the information that readers naturally monitor when reading 
narratives. Durso et al. (2010) classified the information requests of air traffic controllers 
with respect to the five dimensions of situational continuity identified by the Event-
Indexing Model (Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998). Specifically, traffic information requests 
related to protagonists (i.e., characteristics of an aircraft), intentionality (i.e., plans of an 
aircraft), and space (i.e., location of an aircraft) accounted for the majority of information 
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requests. Moreover, controllers preferred information displays that were organized 
around these dimensions (i.e., when pieces of information related to the same dimension 
appeared next to each other on the display) more than those that were not (i.e., when the 
same information was interdigitated). 
1.4.1 Event Segmentation Theory 
According to EST, event segmentation depends upon the processing of feature 
changes (Zacks, Kumar, Abrams, & Mehta, 2009), which include physical as well as 
conceptual changes in a situation. Regarding the physical features of activity, event 
boundaries coincide with changes in motion parameters (e.g., speed or direction), 
especially fine-grained event boundaries (Hard et al., 2006; Newtson, Engquist, & Bois, 
1977; Zacks, 2004; Zacks et al., 2009). Regarding the conceptual features of activity in 
narrative texts and films, changes in each of the five dimensions of situational continuity 
identified by research on narrative comprehension (i.e., the Event Indexing Model; 
Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998) reliably lead to the perception of event boundaries at both 
the fine and coarse-grained levels of activity: time (Kurby & Zacks, 2012; Speer & 
Zacks, 2005; Speer et al., 2007; Zacks et al., 2010), space (Bailey et al., 2017; Kurby, 
Asiala, & Mills, 2014; Kurby & Zacks, 2012; Speer et al., 2007; Zacks et al., 2009; Zacks 
et al., 2010), characters (Bailey et al., 2017; Kurby et al., 2014; Kurby & Zacks, 2012; 
Speer et al., 2007; Zacks et al., 2009; Zacks et al., 2010), causality (Kurby et al., 2014; 
Kurby & Zacks, 2012; Speer et al., 2007; Zacks et al., 2010), and intentionality (Kurby et 




Similar findings obtain when observers indicate each time the situation or 
circumstances in a narrative story or film changes, although these segmentation 
instructions are relatively rare in the literature. Magliano, Kopp, McNerney, Radvansky, 
and Zacks (2012) instructed participants to indicate each time they perceived that the 
“overall situation” had changed in either text or picture-only versions of children’s 
stories. In both modalities, situation-change judgments coincided with the introduction of 
new characters, initiating events (i.e., events that motivate the beginning of a goal-
directed action sequence), and the beginning and outcome of goal-directed action 
sequences. In narrative film, situation-change judgments (i.e., the points in the film in 
which the circumstances or situation changed) correspond to the beginnings and ends of 
goal-directed action sequences (Magliano, Taylor, & Kim, 2005) and changes in spatial-
temporal framework (Magliano et al., 2001). Moreover, similar results obtain when 
people segment situations in non-narrative, loosely structured environments. For 
example, Magliano, Radvansky, Forsythe, and Copeland (2014) had participants segment 
a pre-recorded playback of a first-person shooter video game by indicating each time the 
situation changed for the player in the game. Magliano et al. (2014) found that the 
boundaries between situations corresponded to changes in space, the introduction of 
enemies, and the initiation or accomplishment of the player’s superordinate goals (e.g., 
kill all enemies present).  
Lastly, Mumma and Durso (in revision) found that changes in situation cues and 
situation characteristics (i.e., the “Situational Eight DIAMONDS”; Rauthmann et al., 
2014) independently predicted the likelihood of perceiving the start of a new situation, 
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fine-grained, or coarse-grained event in a narrative film (reproduced in Appendix C). 
Briefly, the DIAMONDS dimensions reflect the different ways in which people perceive, 
describe, and evaluate everyday situations and comprise Duty (e.g., “Does work need to 
be done?”), Intellect (e.g., “Is deep cognitive information processing relevant?”), 
Adversity (e.g., “Is someone under threat?), Mating (e.g., “Is the situation erotically 
charged?”), pOsitivity (e.g., “Is the situation enjoyable?”), Negativity (e.g., “Could the 
situation turn negative?”), Deception (e.g., “Is mistrust an issue?”), and Sociality (e.g., “Is 
meaningful social interaction and relationship building possible?”). 
According to EST, changes in the features of situations coincide with event 
boundaries because these are moments when predicting the near future is most difficult. 
Event models generate “perceptual predictions,” or more accurately, representations of 
the state of the world in the near future (Zacks et al., 2007), that are continually compared 
with sensory input. Event models remain unchanged in the face of varying sensory input 
until an error-detection monitoring system recognizes that prediction error has become 
too large. When this occurs, the event model is replaced with a new model by conferring 
with available sensory input and event schemata. Once the new event model generates 
accurate predictions, it is again shielded from sensory input, remaining stable until the 
next spike in prediction error occurs. The process of updating an event model is 
subjectively perceived as a boundary between events and it is this moment that people 
report during overt segmentation tasks. In sum, EST claims that the segmentation of 
activity is a side effect of our perceptual system attempting to accurately predict the near 
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future (Kurby & Zacks, 2008), which is more difficult when a situation is changing than 
when it remains constant. 
EST offers one explanation of situation model updating effects during narrative 
comprehension; activity becomes difficult to predict when a situation changes in a story, 
and consequently, the reader must update his or her event model (Radvansky & Zacks, 
2014). Indeed, the cognitive consequences of updating an event model are similar to 
those observed when readers are presumably updating their situation model. For example, 
information appearing shortly before an event boundary is less accessible than if there 
was no event boundary (Bailey, Kurby, Sargent & Zacks, 2017; Speer & Zacks, 2005) 
and sentences containing an event boundary are read more slowly than sentences that do 
not contain a boundary (Bailey et al., 2017; Speer & Zacks, 2005; Zacks et al., 2009). 
Consequently, some researchers treat the “situation models” of narrative comprehension 
as a kind of event model (i.e., one that is derived from language rather than directly from 
experience; Radvansky & Zacks, 2014; Zacks et al., 2009). 
1.5 Situations are Future-Oriented 
 Across the literatures, our representations of situations are thought to play an 
important role in facilitating predictions of the future, which help one plan their behavior 
in a situation and respond to circumstances before they arise. However, this role appears 
to be far more central in our representations of experienced situations than in those of 
described situations. Briefly, situation models of narrative text do support predictive 
inferences, which correspond to future states of the world (e.g., the outcome of an event; 
Cook, Limber, & O'Brien, 2001; McDaniel, Schmalhofer, & Keefe, 2001; Peracchi & 
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O'Brien, 2004; Schmalhofer, McDaniel, & Keefe, 2002). During comprehension, 
however, these inferences are generated far less often than other kinds of inferences, 
particularly those that help achieve explanatory coherence (e.g., inferences about 
causality or the goals of characters that explain why events happen; Graesser et al., 1994; 
McNamara & Magliano, 2009; van den Broek, Beker, & Oudega, 2015). When readers 
do generate predictive inferences during reading, it is only when those inferences are 
highly constrained or supported by the preceding narrative context (Magliano, Dijkstra, 
& Zwaan, 1996). When watching a narrative film, however, viewers rely on inferences 
about the past and future to understand events (Levin & Baker, 2017). Unlike narrative 
text, narrative films depict richly situated contexts and moreover, filmmakers routinely 
use cinematic devices that encourage viewers to make specific predictions (e.g., via 
editing or framing; Magliano et al., 1996), further engaging the audience with the filmic 
world. The divergence between the literatures on this point should not be entirely 
surprising; predictive inferences are far more important in real (i.e., experienced) 
situations where it is highly advantageous to anticipate, rather than merely react, to what 
happens next in the situation. 
In social psychology, the characteristics of situations are thought to reflect the 
underlying causal forces that operate in a situation. For example, if a situation is 
perceived as “difficult” or “boring,” then it suggests that the situation itself is exerting 
some kind of observable effect (e.g., on the behavior of the people in the situation; 
Edwards & Templeton, 2005). Recent taxonomies of situation characteristics (Parrigon et 
al., 2017; Sherman, Rauthmann, Brown, Serfass, & Jones, 2015; Rauthmann et al., 2014) 
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have predicted the behaviors of people in situations from the situation’s characteristics in 
conceptually meaningful ways (e.g., situations perceived to be “important” tend to elicit 
conscientious behavior; Parrigon et al. 2017). The ability to summarize a constellation of 
situation cues in terms of a smaller set of characteristics means that “…a perceiver is able 
to understand … what is happening, surmise what might have led to the observed state of 
affairs, extrapolate what might happen and coordinate [one’s] own behaviour 
accordingly,” (Rauthmann et al., 2015, p. 373). 
In engineering psychology, theoretical models of situation awareness generally 
follow either an information processing framework (e.g., Endsley, 1995) or are explicitly 
adapted from Neisser’s (1976) perceptual cycle (e.g., Adams, Tenney, & Pew, 1995; 
Smith & Hancock, 1995). However, common to all models is the idea that our 
representations of situations generate expectations (e.g., about the values of system 
parameters) and that an unexpected change (Flach, Fuefel, Reynolds, Parker, Henrickson, 
& Kellogg, 2017; Landman, Groen, van Paasen, Bronkhorst, & Mulder, 2017) or the 
absence of an expected change (Christoffersen et al., 2007) may suggest a poorly 
calibrated internal model. Endlsey (1995, p. 57) argues that “… the main clue to 
erroneous SA [situation awareness] will occur when a person perceives some new piece 
of data that does not fit with expectations based on his or her internal model … A 
common problem is whether to continue to revise the existing model to account for the 
new data or choose an alternate model that is more appropriate. For the latter to occur, 
something about the data must flag that a different situation is present.” Moreover, 
Wickens (2015) observes that in many dynamic systems, understanding and responding 
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to the current state of the system is sometimes less important than responding to the 
future state, particularly in systems in which responses take time to execute (e.g., moving 
troops to a new location). The ability to “stay ahead” of the situation has been found to be 
predictive of performance in a range of dynamic systems (e.g., Engström et al., 2018; Ma 
& Kaber, 2007; O’Brien & O’Hare, 2007; Sulistyawati, Wickens, & Chui, 2011). 
1.5.1 Event Segmentation Theory 
Prediction is the heart of EST because anticipating the future accurately enables 
organisms to plan their behavior (Eisenberg, Zacks, & Flores, 2018; Zacks et al., 2007). 
Support for the role of prediction in event segmentation comes from both computational 
and behavioral evidence. Regarding the former, Reynolds, Zacks, and Braver (2007) 
implemented the architecture of EST in a neural network. After training, the model was 
able to predict the motions of a 3-dimensional figure performing routine tasks (e.g., 
chopping down a tree) by using spikes in prediction error to identify event boundaries 
and update its model of the current event accordingly. Regarding behavioral evidence, 
Zacks, Kurby, Eisenberg, and Haroutunian (2011) had participants watch videos of 
everyday activities (e.g., washing a car or pitching a tent), during which the video was 
stopped 2.5 seconds before either an event boundary or an event middle (as determined 
by normative segmentation data). Each time the video stopped, participants rated their 
confidence in their ability to predict what would happen in the near future. Then, 
participants chose which of two video-stills (i.e., the actual frame or a foil) would most 
likely occur 5 seconds later. A subsequent study repeated these procedures using a 
Yes/No decision task rather than a two-alternative forced choice task. In both studies, 
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participants were slower, less accurate, and less confident when making predictions 
before an event boundary than when making predictions before the middle of an event. 
Rather than overtly assessing the relationship between predictability and event structure, 
Eisenberg et al. (2018) covertly measured viewers expectations while segmenting videos 
of everyday activities in terms of their “predictive looking” behavior (i.e., anticipatory 
eye-movements towards objects that would eventually be contacted by an actor). 
Eisenberg et al. (2018) measured the amount of time participants spent looking at a target 
object 3 seconds before an actor touched it. When the target object was contacted within 
an event, participants looked ahead to the target object earlier than when the target object 
was contacted near an event boundary. 
Again, EST claims that event boundaries coincide with situational changes 
because it is harder to predict the future at these moments than when the situation is 
relatively constant. Thus, predictive accuracy and the likelihood of perceiving an event 
boundary should each be related to how much the situation is changing at a given 
moment. Indeed, as the number of situational changes in a clause increase (e.g., changes 
in characters or spatial location), the perceived predictability of that clause decreases 
while the probability of identifying an event boundary increases (Zacks et al., 2009); and, 
predictive accuracy decreases, and response latencies increase, as the number of 
situational changes at an event boundary increases (i.e., characters, time, location, and 





1.6 Present Studies 
In summary, our mental representations of situations are bounded, hierarchical, 
multidimensional, and future-oriented (at least for experienced situations). However, the 
important question remains as to how our representations of situations, regardless of 
where they exist (i.e., in the world, text, or film), are formed and modified. The present 
studies argue that EST provides a theoretical framework that is qualified to supply an 
answer. Because Mumma and Durso (in revision; reproduced in Appendix C), have 
already demonstrated that changes in the facets of situations (i.e., situation cues and 
characteristics) increase the likelihood of perceiving a boundary between situations (as 
well as fine-grained events), the primary goal of the present studies is to understand the 
cognitive mechanisms that give rise to the hierarchical structure of our representations of 
situations. 
According to EST, an event boundary identified during overt segmentation 
corresponds to an event model being updated in response to prediction error, with fine 
boundaries marking the advent of a new fine-event model and coarse boundaries marking 
the advent of a new coarse-event model. Although coarse-event models are rarely 
updated without also updating a fine-event model (Radvansky & Zacks, 2011), fine-event 
models are often updated during coarse events (i.e., without updating the coarse-event 
model). In the latter case, EST predicts that whenever a fine event boundary occurs 
within the boundaries of a coarse event, the coarse event model should experience less 
prediction error at that moment than the fine event model.  
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As an illustration, consider the example of going to a coffee shop (Zacks & 
Sargent, 2010). If one is attending to activity at the coarse level of the situation (i.e., 
going to a coffee shop), then one expects that a set of certain fine events will occur (e.g., 
entering the coffee shop, waiting in line, ordering at the register, waiting for your order, 
receiving your order, and leaving the coffee the shop). The beginning of these fine events 
coincides with changes in the situation, such as a change in location (e.g., when moving 
from the door to the end of the line), the introduction of a new person (e.g., a barista 
when ordering), or the start of a new action (e.g., reaching for a cup). Each of these 
changes are inconsistent with the expectations of the current fine event model (e.g., what 
happens when ordering at a register is quite dissimilar to what happens when waiting in a 
line) and consequently, prediction error increases to the point that a new fine model must 
be instantiated. For the event model of the overall situation, however, these changes 
should not increase prediction error because they are each consistent with what one 
expects should happen in the situation. It is not until one begins to the leave the coffee 
shop that the model of the situation no longer generates accurate predictions and 
consequently, a more appropriate model of both the situation and current fine event must 
be instantiated (e.g., walking down the street). 
However, the hypothesis that differential predictive accuracy underlies the 
hierarchical structure of event models has not been tested; we know that predictive 
accuracy, measured either overtly (e.g., making Yes/No or two-alternative forced 
decisions; Huff et al., 2014; Zacks et al., 2011) or covertly (e.g., making predictive eye-
movements; Eisenberg et al., 2018) is better when within an event than when 
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approaching the end of an event (see also Reynolds et al., 2007). Critically, we do not 
know whether predictive accuracy differs between event models when a fine-event model 
is updated but the superordinate (i.e., coarse) event model is not.  
To this end, we conducted a pair of studies in which participants segmented a 
narrative film (The Red Balloon; Lamorisse, 1956) either into situations (i.e., each time a 
new situation has begun), fine events (i.e., each time a new small meaningful unit of 
activity has begun) or events at a neutral granularity (i.e., each time a new meaningful 
unit of activity has begun). This manipulation oriented participants to event models on a 
specific timescale (Zacks et al., 2007) and also served as a manipulation check. The film 
stopped 18 times, each time in one of three places that were determined from previously 
collected normative segmentation data: 1) within an ongoing situation and fine event 
(Within/Within), 2) when nearing the end of a fine event in an ongoing situation 
(Within/Across), or 3) when nearing the end of both a fine event and situation 
(Across/Across). Each time the film stopped, participants rated their confidence in their 
ability to predict what would happen next in the film (Zacks et al., 2011), which reflects 
the state of the error-detection monitoring system (Richmond & Zacks, 2017). 
Afterwards, we assessed their predictive accuracy and participants then resumed 
segmenting the film from where it stopped. 
We examined the effect of hierarchical event structure on predictive accuracy by 
following the “three-pronged method” for studying inference generation (Magliano & 
Graesser, 1991). Briefly, the first prong is to use a theoretical model to predict the kind(s) 
of inferences that should be produced during comprehension. In our case, EST proposes 
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that people generate predictive inferences during the comprehension of ongoing activity. 
The second prong is to expose inferences by using a think-aloud or question-answering 
procedure during comprehension (e.g., answering “What happens next?” at different 
moments in a passage; Graesser et al., 1994). In the first study, participants were asked to 
write down their prediction of what would happen next in the film at each stopping point 
and later, a rating of the consistency of their prediction with what happened in the 
ensuing 5 seconds was obtained. The third prong is to use online behavioral measures 
(e.g., a recognition or lexical decision task) to demonstrate convergence with the verbal 
inference elicitation procedure. In the second study, participants were given either a 
description of what happened next in the film (i.e., a target) or a foil (i.e., an uncommon 
and incorrect prediction) at each stopping point and then decided whether that would 
happen next in the film.  
Assessing predictive accuracy using both a question-answering procedure and a 
Yes/No decision task ensured that our conclusions would not be endemic to one 
approach. For example, previous studies have assessed the effect of event structure on 
predictive accuracy via two-alternative forced decision (Huff et al., 2014; Zacks et al., 
2011) or Yes/No decision tasks (Zacks et al., 2011). These tasks have the disadvantage 
that participants can answer them by performing a simple feature comparison between the 
probe (i.e., a target or foil) and the preceding context (Magliano & Graesser, 1991), 
rather than a prediction per se. Answering what-happens-next questions avoids this 
problem, but unlike decision tasks, forces participants to verbalize their perceptual 
predictions, which may be difficult to articulate. Thus, convergence across both studies 
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would only strengthen our conclusions whereas divergence would, at the very least, be 
instructive. Regarding the primary goal of the present studies, we hypothesized the 
following: 
Hypothesis 1: Predictive accuracy and confidence should be greater when within 
an event than when approaching an event boundary, but only when within an 
event or near an event boundary on the timescale to which one is oriented (i.e., to 
situations or fine events; Figure 1). 
Hypothesis 2: The predictive accuracy of and confidence in event models of 
situations should only be greater than that of fine-event models when nearing the 
end of a fine event in an ongoing situation (i.e., Within/Across; Figure 1). 
Because the following studies were the first to measure subjective confidence, 
predictive accuracy, and segmentation, we also tested several critical, but unexamined 
hypotheses regarding the general mechanisms of EST: 
Hypothesis 3: Confidence in one’s ability to predict what happens next should be 
negatively related to the likelihood of perceiving an event boundary in the near 
future. 
Hypothesis 4: The accuracy of one’s prediction about what happens next should 
be negatively related to the likelihood of perceiving an event boundary in the near 
future. 
Hypothesis 5: Confidence in one’s ability to predict what happens next should be 




Figure 1 – The hypothesized effects of Orientation (Situation, Neutral, Fine) and 
Probe Type (Within/Within, Within/Across, Across/Across) on predictive accuracy 















































CHAPTER 2.       EXPERIMENT 1 
 
Each time the film stopped in Experiment 1, participants rated their confidence in 
their ability to predict what would happen next and then wrote down their prediction of 
what would happen next in the film. This approach is consistent with the assumption that 
event models are working memory representations and consequently, their contents (i.e., 
predictions) should be reportable while comprehending ongoing activity (Hard et al., 
2006; Kurby & Zacks, 2011; Kurby & Zacks, 2012; Zacks et al., 2001; Zacks et al., 
2007). According to EST, prediction error is associated with subjective uncertainty 
(Richmond & Zacks, 2017; Zacks et al., 2011) and should be minimal as long as sensory 
input is consistent with the prediction(s) of an event model (Huff et al., 2014; Zacks et 
al., 2007). Accordingly, the accuracy of each prediction was rated in terms of its 
consistency with what happened next in the film (i.e., in the 5 seconds of the film 
immediately following a probe). 
2.1 Method 
2.1.1 Participants 
We targeted a sample size of 90 participants (30 in each level of Orientation) to 
detect a moderately sized interaction (Cohen’s f = .25; Cohen, 1972) between Probe Type 
and Orientation with 80% power. Ninety-five undergraduate students from the Georgia 
Institute of Technology participated in partial fulfillment of a research familiarization 
requirement. All data for five participants were excluded because they reported on the 
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post-experiment questionnaire having seen the film before. These participants were 
replaced. The remaining 90 participants had a mean age of 19.6 years (SD = 1.26) and 
56% were male. 
2.1.2 Design 
Experiment 1 used a 3 (Orientation: Situation, Neutral, Fine) x 3 (Probe Type: 
Within/Within, Within/Across, Across/Across) mixed design with Orientation varying 
between subjects and Probe Type varying within subjects. For each level of Probe Type 
within a participant, we measured his or her confidence in the ability to predict what 
would happen next in the film as well as how consistent his or her prediction was with 
what actually happened next. We also recorded the exact moment in time that participants 
reported an event boundary during the film. 
2.1.3 Materials 
2.1.3.1 Probe Locations 
Using existing segmentation data of The Red Balloon (Kurby et al., 2014; 
Mumma & Durso, in revision), a separate normative situation and fine segmentation 
profile was created by dividing the film into 394 5-second time bins and then computing 
the probability of someone identifying at least one event boundary in each time bin. Time 
bins with a probability greater than or equal to .50 were considered consensual 
boundaries. In total, 67 consensual fine boundaries and 16 consensual situation 
boundaries were identified, 10 of which (63%) were also consensual fine boundaries. 
Thus, consensual situation boundaries tend to be a subset of consensual fine boundaries, 
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just as coarse boundaries also tend to be a subset of fine boundaries, regardless of 
whether segmentation grain is manipulated between subjects (e.g., Hanson & Hirst, 1989; 
Newtson, 1973) or within subjects (e.g., Hard et al., 2006; Zacks et al., 2001). Moreover, 
the observed overlap between fine and situation boundaries is not attributable to chance; 
the joint probability of a time bin being both a consensual fine and situation boundary 
was (67/394) x (16/394) = .007. Using an exact goodness of fit test, the observed number 
of time bins containing both a consensual fine and situation boundary (10) was 
significantly greater than the number expected by chance (.007 x 394 = 2.76), p = .001. 
Using the consensual situation and fine boundaries, we chose six probe locations 
that were within an ongoing situation and fine event (Within/Within), six when nearing 
the end of a fine event in an ongoing situation (Within/Across), and six when nearing the 
end of both a fine event and a situation (Across/Across). Within/Within probes were 
chosen from among the time bins with the lowest probability of being perceived as a fine 
and situation boundary, Within/Across probes from bins with the greatest probability of 
being perceived as a fine boundary but not a situation boundary, and Across/Across 
probes from bins with the greatest probability of being perceived as a fine and a situation 
boundary (Figure 2; Table 1). Additionally, probes were selected so that the frequency of 






Figure 2 – Boundaries in the upper row demarcate situations (e.g., S1) and 
boundaries in the lower row demarcate fine events within a situation (e.g., S1, E1). 
Marker “A” is a “Within/Within” probe, “B” is a “Within/Across” probe, and “C” 
is an “Across/Across” probe. 
 
 
Table 1 – Probability of perceiving a fine or situation boundary for each level of 
Probe Type. 
 Within/Within Within/Across Across/Across 
 M SD M SD M SD 
Fine Boundary .03 .04 .60 .06 .72 .12 
Situation 
Boundary 




Table 2 – Frequency of each type of probe in each clip. 
Clip Within/Within Within/Across Across/Across 
Total Number 
of Probes 
1 1 2 1 4 
2 2 1 2 5 
3 1 2 2 5 
4 2 1 1 4 
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To determine when, precisely, each probe should occur in the film, the average 
(mean) timestamp for each of the chosen boundaries was obtained. Consistent with the 
methods of similar studies (Huff et al., 2014; Zacks et al., 2011), experimental probes 
involving a single event boundary (i.e., Within/Across) occurred 2.5 seconds before the 
average timestamp for that boundary. Probes involving two consensual boundaries (i.e., 
Across/Across) occurred 2.5 seconds before the average of the two average timestamps. 
Lastly, probes that did not involve an event boundary (i.e., Within/Within) occurred 2.5 
seconds before the middle of a time bin designated as a Within/Within probe location. On 
average, probes occurred 1.88 minutes apart from each other (SD = 0.84). 
2.1.3.2 Consistency Ratings 
Three raters independently rated the consistency of all 1,620 predictions (90 
participants x 18 predictions per participant) while blind to Probe Type and Orientation. 
Raters compared each prediction to a video clip of the 5 seconds that followed the 
corresponding probe location in the film. For each prediction, raters answered the 
question, “How consistent is the prediction with what happens next in the film?” using a 
scale that ranged from 1, “Not at all consistent,” to 4, “Extremely consistent,” (Table 3). 
For each participant under each rater, the mean consistency rating of the six 
Within/Within, Within/Across, and Across/Across probes was computed and 
subsequently averaged across raters for hypothesis testing. The interrater reliability of the 
average consistency rating for each level of Probe Type was assessed with three separate 
intraclass correlation coefficients (ICCs) using an average measures absolute agreement 
definition (ICC [2, k]; Shrout & Fleiss, 1979). 
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Table 3 – Consistency rating scale. 
Value Label Description 
1 Not at all consistent 
What happens next 
completely precludes 
prediction. 
2 Slightly consistent 
What happens next likely 
precludes prediction. 
3 Moderately consistent 
What happens next does not 
likely preclude prediction. 
4 Extremely consistent 
Prediction describes 




After providing informed consent, participants completed a brief demographics 
questionnaire and were then randomly assigned to one of the three levels of Orientation 
(i.e., Situation, Neutral, or Fine). Next, participants were seated approximately 61 
centimeters away from an 81-centimeter diagonal computer screen. The experimenter 
told participants that they would watch a film and (depending on their assigned level of 
Orientation) press the spacebar each time they felt that: 
Situation Orientation: a new situation has begun in the film. A “situation” is 
whatever you think the current circumstances or state of affairs in the film is. 
Neutral Orientation: a new meaningful unit of activity has begun in the film. What 
counts as a “meaningful unit of activity” is entirely up to you. 
Fine Orientation: a new small meaningful unit of activity has begun in the film. 




Lastly, the experimenter explained that at different times throughout the film, 
participants will also be asked to rate a statement and then write down what they think 
would happen next in the film. 
 All stimuli were presented with PsychoPy (Pierce, 2007). Participants practiced 
the experimental procedure while watching a 4.4-minute-long clip from North by 
Northwest (Hitchcock, 1959), which was stylistically similar to The Red Balloon (e.g., 
contained little dialogue and unfolded nearly continuously in space and time). At the end 
of the practice clip, participants rated their confidence in their ability to predict what 
would happen next in the film using a scale from 1, “Not at all,” to 6, “Extremely,” 
(Zacks et al., 2011). Immediately afterward, participants wrote down what they thought 
would happen next in the film in a booklet. When finished, they pressed the spacebar to 
resume the film and the program reminded them briefly of their assigned segmentation 
instructions. The experimenter remained in the room for the entire practice session to 
ensure that participants understood the task and to address any questions or concerns 
related to the task. 
 The participants then repeated these procedures while watching The Red Balloon, 
which lasted approximately 33 minutes and was divided into four successive clips, lasting 
7.7, 7.8, 7.4, and 10 minutes, respectively (Zacks et al., 2009). Participants were allowed 
to take a brief break after finishing each clip. During each clip, the film stopped at the 
predetermined probe locations, participants rated their confidence and then wrote down a 
prediction in a small booklet with a single blank page for each probe. Afterwards, the 
program reminded the participant of their segmentation instructions and the film resumed 
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playing from where it stopped. The booklets were replaced after each clip and always 
contained more cards than probes so that participants could not anticipate the number of 
probes in a clip. The experimental program recorded the participant’s confidence rating at 
each probe location as well as the exact moment(s) he or she pressed the spacebar in 
between successive probe locations, which was rounded to the nearest whole second. At 
the end of the experiment, participants completed a post-experiment questionnaire about 
their experience and indicated whether they had seen The Red Balloon before. 
2.1.5 Analyses 
For all analyses, the criterion for significance was an α level of .05. When 
corrections for multiple comparisons were used (e.g., the Bonferroni correction), the 
reported p values are adjusted and can be compared to .05. The violation of sphericity in 
mixed model ANOVAs was assessed with Mauchly’s sphericity test and if violated, 
degrees of freedom were adjusted using the Greenhouse-Geisser correction. As estimates 




2.2.1 Manipulation Check 
To determine whether the Orientation manipulation successfully altered how 
participants segmented the film, we examined the degree to which situation and fine 
segmentation in the present study were related to normative segmentation data from 
previous studies using The Red Balloon (Kurby et al., 2014; Mumma & Durso, in 
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revision), in which participants segmented the film either into situations or fine events. 
Furthermore, we also compared the segmentation rate of participants oriented to 
situations and those oriented to fine events in the present study. Prior to both analyses, 
the film was divided into 394 5-second time bins. For each participant, each time bin was 
coded with either a one or a zero, indicating whether a participant reported at least one 
event boundary within the corresponding 5-second long window of time.  
2.2.1.1 Segmentation Agreement 
In these analyses, we examined the extent to which the boundaries identified by 
participants in the present study were related to the normative segmentation of a separate 
group of participants with the same orientation (i.e., to situations or fine events). In the 
event segmentation literature, this measure is referred to as “segmentation agreement” 
and is used widely (e.g., Bailey et al., 2013; Kurby & Zacks, 2011; Newberry & Bailey, 
2019; Sargent et al., 2013; Swallow et al., 2018) and is also predictive of psychological 
outcomes (e.g., Bailey et al., 2013; Kurby & Zacks, 2011). 
Using Lorch and Myers’ (1990) recommended regression approach for analyzing 
repeated measures data, we estimated a logistic regression equation separately for each 
participant that predicted their binary segmentation data simultaneously from the 
normative fine and situation segmentation data from a separate group of participants. 
Using the segmentation data from previous studies (Kurby et al., 2014; Mumma & Durso, 
in revision), a separate normative situation and normative fine segmentation profile was 
created by dividing the film into 394 5-second time bins and then computing the 
probability of a person identifying at least one event boundary in each time bin. Both the 
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normative situation and fine segmentation profiles were standardized (i.e., z-score 
transformed) prior to regression analysis. To assess the reliability of the two logistic 
regression coefficients over participants from each level of Orientation, we tested 
whether the mean logistic regression coefficient of each predictor was different from zero 
using a two-tailed, one-sample t-test (with Bonferroni’s correction for multiple 
comparisons). 
 In Experiment 1, the likelihood of reporting a situation boundary was positively 
related to the normative probability of identifying a situation boundary (Mean β = 0.65, 
SE = 0.05), t(29) = 14.30, p < .001, d = 1.95, but not the normative probability of 
identifying a fine boundary (M = -0.01, SE = 0.05), t(29) = -0.17, p = 1, d = -0.03. The 
likelihood of reporting a fine boundary was positively related to the normative probability 
of identifying a fine boundary (M = 0.24, SE = 0.06), t(29) = 4.15, p = .002, d = 0.76, and 
also a situation boundary (M = 0.48, SE = 0.04), t(29) = 10.71, p < .001, d = 1.95.  
2.2.1.2 Segmentation Rate 
We expected that situations would be segmented less frequently than fine events 
because situations are more extended in time (i.e., coarser-grained) than are fine events. 
This hypothesis is supported from previous research using The Red Balloon (Kurby et al., 
2014; Mumma & Durso, in revision), which found that participants identified 
significantly fewer situation boundaries (M = 74.68 boundaries, SE = 5.83) than fine 
boundaries (M = 112.15 boundaries, SE = 9.75) in the film. 
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For each participant, segmentation rate in each of the four clips was calculated by 
summing the number of time bins in which a participant identified at least one boundary 
in a clip and then dividing by the total number of time bins in that clip. We included Clip 
(1, 2, 3, 4) as a factor to determine whether the segmentation rate of participants with a 
situation-level orientation became fine-grained over the course of the film. 
Segmentation rate was analyzed with a 4 x 2 mixed ANOVA with Clip (1, 2, 3, 4) 
as a within-subjects factor and Orientation (Situation, Fine) as a between-subjects factor. 
This analysis revealed a significant main effect of Clip, F(2.31, 133.93) = 5.55, p = .003, 
η2partial = .09, but no significant effect of Orientation, F(1, 58) = 3.02, p = .088, η
2
partial = 
.05, nor interaction between Clip and Orientation, F(2.31, 133.93) = 1.18, p = .32, η2partial 
= .02 (Figure 3). Because differences between clips were not theoretically interesting, 





Figure 3 – Mean segmentation rate as a function of Clip and Orientation. Error bars 
are the standard error of the mean. 
 
 
In summary, we found that situation segmentation in the present study was 
uniquely related to the situation segmentation of another group of participants. On the 
other hand, fine segmentation in the present study was related to normative fine 
segmentation, but also to normative situation segmentation. That fine segmentation was 
also related to normative situation segmentation was not surprising given that the 
beginning of a new situation is very likely to also be the beginning of a new fine event. 
As we expected, situation segmentation was also consistently coarser in grain than fine 
segmentation throughout the film (Figure 3), although this difference was not statistically 



























two manipulation checks provides more reason to believe that situation segmentation 
differed from fine segmentation in the expected direction than not. 
2.2.2 Neutral-Grain Segmentation 
Neutral-grain segmentation reflects the grain at which participants naturally (or 
preferentially) segmented the film. Like fine segmentation, neutral-grain segmentation 
was also positively related to both the normative probability of a situation boundary (M = 
0.54, SE = 0.07), t(29) = 7.34, p < .001, d = 1.34, and a fine boundary (M = 0.21, SE = 
0.05), t(29) = 4.10, p = .002, d = 0.75.  
To compare the segmentation rates of participants under each Orientation, 
segmentation rate was analyzed with a 4 x 3 mixed ANOVA with Clip (1, 2, 3, 4) as a 
within-subjects factor and Orientation (Situation, Neutral, Fine) as a between-subjects 
factor. This analysis revealed a significant main effect of Clip, F(2.13, 185.40) = 9.10, p 
< .001, η2partial = .10, but no significant effect of Orientation, F(2, 87) = 1.88, p = .16, 
η2partial = .04, nor interaction between Clip and Orientation, F(4.26, 185.40) = 0.85, p = 
.50, η2partial = .02 (Figure 4). Thus, although the analysis of segmentation agreement 
suggested that neutral-grain segmentation was more like fine than situation segmentation, 
analysis of segmentation rates could not clearly distinguish neutral-grain segmentation 





Figure 4 – Mean segmentation rate as a function of Clip and Orientation. Error bars 
are the standard error of the mean. 
 
 
2.2.3 Confidence Ratings 
Mean confidence ratings were subjected to a 3 x 3 mixed ANOVA with Probe 
Type (Within/Within, Within/Across, Across/Across) as a within-subjects factor and 
Orientation (Situation, Neutral, Fine) as a between-subjects factor. This analysis revealed 
a significant main effect of Probe Type, F(2, 174) = 34.61, p < .001, η2partial = .29, but no 
significant effect of Orientation, F(2, 87) = 0.14, p = .87, η2partial = .003, nor interaction 
between Probe Type and Orientation, F(4, 174) = 1.64, p = .17, η2partial = .04. 
We examined the main effect of Probe Type using orthogonal polynomial 




























incrementally increasing hierarchical event structure - zero event boundaries 
(Within/Within), one event boundary (i.e., a fine event boundary; Within/Across), and 
two event boundaries (i.e., a fine event plus a situation boundary; Across/Across). Trend 
analysis of Probe Type indicated a significant linear, F(1, 87) = 53.05, p < .001, η2partial = 
.38, as well as quadratic trend, F(1, 87) = 7.36, p = .008, η2partial = .08. These trends 
suggest that confidence in one’s ability to predict what happens next is greatest when 
within a situation and fine event (Within/Within; M = 3.45, SE = 0.09), but is similarly 
low when nearing either the end of a fine event in an ongoing situation (Within/Across; 
M = 3.09, SE = 0.08) or the end of both a fine event and a situation (Across/Across; M = 
2.97, SE = 0.08; Figure 5). 
 
 
Figure 5 – Mean confidence rating as a function of Probe Type. Error bars are the 




























2.2.3.1 Confidence and Segmentation 
Event segmentation theory proposes that an error-detection monitoring system 
regulates event model updating and that prediction error is associated with subjective 
uncertainty (Richmond & Zacks, 2017; Zacks et al., 2011). Consequently, confidence in 
one’s ability to predict what happens next should be negatively related to the likelihood 
of perceiving an event boundary in the near future (i.e., shortly after the resumption of the 
film after a probe). To determine whether a participant segmented after each probe, we 
established a lenient response window (as probes may have been locally disruptive to 
event segmentation). Based on the mean response latency in the 10 seconds following 
boundary-probes (i.e., Within/Across and Across/Across probes), we included only key-
presses that fell within 5.29 seconds ± 1.96 standard deviations (SD = 2.41) after each 
probe location. However, we excluded key-presses falling within 1.96 standard 
deviations before the next closest consensual boundary at the same level of Orientation 
(e.g., the next consensual situation boundary if segmenting the film into situations); for 
neutral-grain segmentation, we used the next closest consensual fine boundary. 
The relationship between confidence ratings (standardized separately for each 
participant) and the report of event boundaries shortly after each probe location was 
examined using the Lorch and Myers (1990) procedure described previously. Briefly, for 
each participant, we estimated a logistic regression equation that predicted that 
participant’s binary segmentation data from his or her confidence ratings. Given the small 
number of observations for each participant, logistic regression coefficients were 
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estimated using penalized maximum likelihood rather than conventional maximum 
likelihood, which may produce biased estimates in small samples (Allison, 1999). 
Logistic regression coefficients for 5 participants (17%) in the Neutral orientation 
and 2 participants (7%) in the Fine orientation could not be estimated because these 
participants did not segment after any of the probes. Using the remaining participants, a 
one-way ANOVA with Orientation as a between-subjects factor revealed no differences 
among logistic regression coefficients between levels of Orientation, F(2, 80) = 0.21, p = 
.81, η2partial = .01. Consequently, data were collapsed across levels of Orientation and 
collectively compared to zero using a one-sample t-test. The mean logistic regression 
coefficient (M = -0.24, SE = 0.07) was significantly less than zero, t(82) = -3.54, p < .001, 
d = -0.39. Thus, the more confident one is in his or her ability to predict what will happen 
next, the less likely he or she is to report an event boundary in the near future. 
2.2.4 Consistency Ratings 
The reliability of the average consistency rating for each level of Probe Type was 
assessed with three separate intraclass correlation coefficients (ICCs), which used an 
average measures absolute agreement definition (ICC [2, k]; Shrout & Fleiss, 1979). 
According to conventional guidelines for interpreting the values of ICCs (Cicchetti, 
1994), the ICCs ranged from good (Within/Within ICC = .62; 95% CI = .43 - .75) to 
excellent (Within/Across ICC = .78; 95% CI = .69 - .85 and Across/Across ICC = .82; 
95% CI = .75 - .88). 
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Mean consistency ratings were subjected to a 3 x 3 mixed ANOVA with Probe 
Type (Within/Within, Within/Across, Across/Across) as a within-subjects factor and 
Orientation (Situation, Neutral, Fine) as a between-subjects factor. This analysis revealed 
a significant main effect of Probe Type, F(1.64, 143.03) = 37.58, p < .001, η2partial = .30, 
but no significant effect of Orientation, F(2, 87) = 1.53, p = .22, η2partial = .03, nor 
interaction between Probe Type and Orientation, F(3.29, 143.03) = 0.28, p = .89, η2partial 
= .01. 
Trend analysis of Probe Type indicated a significant linear, F(1, 87) = 48.47, p < 
.001, η2partial = .36, as well as quadratic trend, F(1, 87) = 24.66, p < .001, η
2
partial = .22. 
Thus, predictions made within an ongoing situation and fine event (Within/Within; M = 
2.95, SE = 0.03) are most consistent with what happens in the very near future compared 
to predictions made when nearing either the end of a fine event in an ongoing situation 
(Within/Across; M = 2.60, SE = 0.03) or the end of both a fine event and situation 





Figure 6 – Mean consistency rating as a function of Probe Type. Error bars are the 
standard error of the mean. 
 
2.2.4.1 Consistency and Confidence 
To examine the relationship between confidence and consistency ratings, a linear 
regression equation that predicted consistency ratings from confidence ratings 
(standardized for each participant separately) was computed for each participant (Lorch 
& Myers, 1990). A one-way ANOVA with Orientation as a between-subjects factor 
revealed no differences in regression coefficients between levels of Orientation, F(2, 87) 
= 0.43, p = .65, η2partial = .01. Consequently, data were collapsed across levels of 
Orientation and collectively compared to zero using a one-sample t-test. The mean 
regression coefficient was small but statistically greater than zero (M = 0.10, SE = 0.02),        




























next, the more consistent one’s prediction is with what actually happens in the near 
future. 
2.2.4.2 Consistency and Segmentation 
Given that confidence ratings were negatively related to the likelihood of 
reporting an event boundary in the near future, we determined whether the accuracy of 
one’s prediction was also negatively related to the likelihood of reporting an event 
boundary in the near future. As before, a separate logistic regression equation was 
estimated for each subject using penalized maximum likelihood estimation. Logistic 
regression coefficients for the same 5 participants in the Neutral orientation and 2 
participants in the Fine orientation could not be estimated because these participants did 
not report a boundary after any probe.  
Using the remaining participants, a one-way ANOVA with Orientation as a 
between-subjects factor revealed no difference in the logistic regression coefficients 
among levels of Orientation, F(2, 80) = 1.64, p = .20, η2partial = .04. Consequently, data 
were collapsed across levels of Orientation and collectively compared to zero using a 
one-sample t-test. The mean logistic regression coefficient (M = -0.25, SE = 0.07) was 
significantly less than zero, t(82) = -3.52, p < .001, d = -0.39. Thus, the more consistent 
one’s prediction is with the near future, the less likely he or she is to report an event 




 In summary, Experiment 1 provided converging evidence for the general 
mechanisms of EST, but evidence against the hypothesis that the hierarchical structure of 
event segmentation is attributable to the differential predictive accuracies of event models 
on different timescales (i.e., of situations versus fine events). 
Regarding the former, EST proposes that event models are updated in response to 
transient increases in prediction error, which is associated with one’s subjective 
uncertainty about the future (Zacks et al., 2011). It follows that confidence in one’s 
ability to predict the future and the accuracy of one’s prediction should each be 
negatively related to the likelihood of perceiving an event boundary (i.e., updating the 
current event model) in the near future. Indeed, we found that the more confident about 
and the more consistent one’s prediction is with what happens in the near future, the less 
likely one is to subsequently report an event boundary. Moreover, the more confident one 
is in their ability to predict the future, the more consistent one’s prediction is with what 
happens next. 
 However, Experiment 1 failed to provide evidence for the differential predictive 
accuracies of event models on different timescales. Regardless of how participants were 
oriented to activity in the film, both their confidence in their ability to predict the future 
and the extent to which their predictions were consistent with what happened in the near 
future followed a pattern that we expected (at least) for fine segmentation (see Figure 1). 
Specifically, confidence and consistency were highest when assessed within a fine event 
in an ongoing situation (Within/Within) but were equally low when assessed either near 
the end of a fine event in an ongoing situation (Within/Across) or near the end of a fine 
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event and the current situation (Across/Across). This pattern suggests that, regardless of 
one’s orientation to activity, confidence and predictive accuracy vary as a function of 
whether a fine event boundary is imminent or not.  
The failure to observe an effect of Orientation on confidence or predictive 
accuracy cannot be attributed to a failure to manipulate Orientation. Importantly, 
situation and fine segmentation were differentially related to the normative situation and 
fine segmentation of a different group of participants who segmented The Red Balloon 
into either situations or fine events. Consistent with our expectations, situations were also 
segmented more coarsely than were fine events throughout the film, although statistical 
support for this observation was not as strong. Otherwise, neutral-grain segmentation 
bared some resemblance to fine segmentation, suggesting that participants may have 
preferentially segmented the film into small events. 
In short, the results of Experiment 1 suggest that participants had event models of 
activity only at the fine-grained level. In support, both confidence and predictive 
accuracy varied simply as a function of whether a fine event boundary was imminent or 
not, regardless of one’s orientation. Moreover, this pattern was observed even though 
participants oriented to situations segmented the film differently than participants 






CHAPTER 3.       EXPERIMENT 2 
 
 Methodologically, Experiment 2 was identical to Experiment 1 except that we 
assessed predictive accuracy (i.e., discriminability) using a Yes/No decision task rather 
than an explicit prediction task. Using a different operationalization of predictive 
accuracy allowed us to test the generalizability of our findings from Experiment 1, 
consistent with the three-pronged method for studying inference generation (Magliano & 
Graesser, 1991) and also with how previous studies have assessed the effect of event 
structure on predictive accuracy (Huff et al., 2014; Zacks et al., 2011).  
Unlike previous studies (Huff et al., 2014; Zacks et al., 2011), however, we used 
brief verbal statements as targets and foils rather than pictures (i.e., video-stills). Doing 
so circumvented the challenges of creating pictorial targets and foils from a narrative film 
(e.g., equating the visual or cinematic features of targets and foils) and moreover, a verbal 
statement can convey extended activity less ambiguously than a single static picture. 
Lastly, we did not assess the relationship between confidence ratings and accuracy and 
the likelihood of segmentation and accuracy (as we did in Experiment 1) because it is not 
possible to separate the contribution(s) of discriminability and bias to accuracy (i.e., 






We targeted a sample size of 90 participants (30 in each level of Orientation) to 
detect a moderately sized interaction (Cohen’s f = .25) between Probe Type and 
Orientation with 80% power. Eighty-eight undergraduate students from the Georgia 
Institute of Technology participated in partial fulfillment of a research familiarization 
requirement. All data for four participants were excluded because two participants 
reported that they had seen the film before on the post-experiment questionnaire and two 
participants failed to follow instructions consistently during the experiment. These 
participants were replaced. The remaining 84 participants had a mean age of 20 years (SD 
= 1.5) and were 52% male. 
3.1.2 Design 
 Like Experiment 1, Experiment 2 used a 3 (Orientation: Situation, Neutral, Fine) 
x 3 (Probe Type: Within/Within, Within/Across, Across/Across) mixed design with 
Orientation varying between subjects and Probe Type varying within subjects. For each 
level of Probe Type, we measured each participant’s confidence in his or her ability to 
predict what would happen next in the film, how quickly and accurately he or she could 
identify what would actually happen next, as well as his or her response bias. We also 






The target for each probe was a brief description of what happened during the 5 
seconds of film immediately following the probe. To ensure that the descriptions of 
targets would not be idiosyncratic, three judges independently watched and described (in 
5 – 10 words) what happened in the 5 seconds following each probe location. For each 
probe location, a fourth judge (JM) produced a single description that captured the 
common (i.e., consensual) elements of the three descriptions. At one probe location, for 
example, the three judges described the corresponding clip as, “Boy climbs down post, 
grabs balloon and bag, then walks away,” “Boy picks up bag, holds balloon in mouth, 
keeps walking,” and “Boy walks away from lamp post with the balloon.” Accordingly, 
the fourth judge summarized these three descriptions as “The boy walks away with the 
balloon.” 
3.1.3.2 Foils 
From the 1,620 predictions generated in Experiment 1, our goal was to create a 
foil for each probe location, which would be based on an incorrect prediction that was 
infrequently generated under each level of Orientation. We opted to use infrequent (rather 
than frequent) predictions to avoid obtaining a floor effect in predictive accuracy. To this 
end, we used a card sorting procedure to reduce the 1,620 predictions into a smaller 
number of “universal predictions” at each probe location (i.e., similar predictions that 
were generated under each level of Orientation).  
For each probe location, three judges independently sorted the 30 predictions into 
piles such that individual predictions within the same pile were more similar to each other 
than individual predictions from different piles. Judges were allowed to make as many or 
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as few piles as they felt was necessary, with each pile containing at least one prediction. 
For each pile containing more than one prediction, judges created a short descriptive label 
that captured what the constituent predictions had in common (i.e., formed categories of 
predictions). At one probe location, for example, one judge placed the predictions “He 
buys a pastry,” “The boy buys some dessert,” and “The boy will buy a treat for himself,” 
together in a pile labelled “The boy buys some food.” The judges repeated this entire 
process three times, once for each level of Orientation. 
To identify consensual categories at each probe location, a fourth judge (JM), who 
did not participate in the original card sort, examined the category labels given to each 
prediction by the three judges. If at least two of the three judges categorized a prediction 
under a similar label, the fourth judge created a new category label that captured what the 
category labels had in common. At one probe location, for example, the three original 
judges placed the prediction “The boy will keep walking to wherever he is going,” in a 
pile of predictions labeled “Boy keeps walking,” “The kid keeps walking,” and “Boy 
continues walking”, respectively. Thus, for that prediction, the fourth judge created a 
consensual label entitled, “The boy continues walking.” For each probe location under 
each level of Orientation, the fourth judge generated a list of consensual category labels 
with each label applying to at least two predictions at a probe location. The median 
number of consensual categories identified per probe location was 5 (Range: 2 – 8), 5 




Next, all four judges independently sorted the predictions at each probe location 
using only the consensual category labels for that probe location identified by the fourth 
judge. Judges labelled any prediction that did not fit into a category label as “Other.” The 
judges repeated this process for each level of Orientation. Agreement was achieved if at 
least three of the four judges placed a given prediction in the same category. On average, 
judges achieved consensus for 98% (SD = 0.02), 97% (SD = 0.04), and 95% (SD = 0.05) 
of predictions at each probe location under Situation, Neutral, and Fine orientations, 
respectively. The few predictions on which the judges disagreed were each resolved via 
discussion among the group. For each level of Orientation, the card sorting process 
dramatically reduced the 540 predictions across all probe locations to 184, 210, and 187 
unique predictions in the Situation, Neutral, and Fine orientations, respectively (see 
Appendix A for a table of predictions for each probe location). 
Using the reduced list of predictions, we proceeded to identify predictions at each 
of the 18 probe locations that appeared under all three levels of Orientation (i.e., 
“universal predictions”). To this end, a single judge (JM) identified similar predictions 
that appeared under each level of Orientation (i.e., “constituent predictions”) and then 
labelled the universal prediction accordingly. Universal predictions could be made of 
categories of predictions, lone predictions that did not fit into any category under a 
certain level of Orientation (i.e., a singleton), or both. At one probe location, for example, 
the universal prediction “The balloon will get the key to the door,” comprised a category 
of predictions from two levels of Orientation (“The balloon will get the key to the door,” 
and “The balloon will get the key to the door.”) and one singleton from the other level of 
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Orientation (“The balloon will try to get the key and rescue the boy.”). Agreement across 
the 18 probe locations was very high, with the majority of the judges identifying the same 
three constituent predictions for 94% (62/66) of the universal predictions. As before, the 
few universal predictions that failed to reach consensus were each resolved via discussion 
among the group. The median number of universal predictions at each probe location was 
3.5 (Range: 2 – 6). 
To create a foil for each of the 18 probe locations, we drew from each probe 
location’s respective set of universal predictions. Ultimately, our goal was to select 
universal predictions for each probe location that 1) did not come true in the film, 2) were 
low in consistency with what happens shortly after a probe (i.e., less than 3, which 
corresponds to “Moderately consistent”), and 3) that only a small and similar number of 
participants made under each level of Orientation (i.e., less than 25% in each level of 
Orientation). 
For each of the three constituent predictions of a universal prediction, we obtained 
the percentage of participants who made that prediction. At one probe location, for 
example, the universal prediction “The children try to grab the balloon,” comprised 
“Children will try to catch the balloon,” with 7% of participants with a situation-level 
orientation making this prediction, “Children will try to catch the balloon,” which was 
made by 7% of those with a neutral orientation, and “The kids try and grab the balloon,” 
which was made by 3% of those with a fine orientation. To obtain the consistency rating 
of a constituent prediction, we first obtained the consistency rating for each individual 
prediction (averaged over raters) in a constituent prediction and then averaged those 
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values together. Given the criteria above, we ultimately selected universal predictions 
with constituent predictions that did not come true and were similarly infrequent and low 
in their consistency with what happened next in the film. Table 4 shows the percentage of 
all participants making each universal prediction (i.e., foil) as well as the average 
consistency rating of each universal prediction. 
Lastly, the number of syllables for each target-foil pair were matched as closely as 
possible. Across the 18 probe locations, the median number of syllables for targets and 
foils was 9 with a range of 6 – 11 and 5 – 11, respectively. For all participants, half of the 
18 probes were targets (i.e., the correct answer was “Yes”). In each level of Orientation, 
however, we randomly assigned half of the participants to one random sequence of 












Table 4 – Targets and foils for each probe location, with the percentage of all 
participants making each universal prediction (i.e., foil) and the mean consistency of 
the foil. 
Probe  Probe Type Target Foil Percentage Consistency 
1 Within/Across 
The boy walks 
towards the 
stairs. 




The boy walks 
away with the 
balloon. 




The boy runs to 
a door. 




The boy and the 
man walk 
together. 
The boy and the 




The boy releases 
the balloon 
outside. 
The boy ties the 




The boy and the 
balloon wait to 
board the bus. 
The boy and the 




The boy gets off 
the bus. 






escapes from the 
man. 





follows the man. 
The children try 




The men shake 
hands and part 
ways. 
The balloon 
takes the key 
from the man. 
4% 2.25 
11 Across/Across 
The boy and the 
balloon reunite. 




The boy and the 
girl part ways. 





The boy walks 
with his mother. 
The boy's mother 






Table 4 (continued). 
14 Within/Within 
The boy checks 
his pockets for 
money. 
The boy uses the 




The boy and the 
balloon hide in a 
doorway. 





A boy fatally 
stomps on the 
balloon. 





The balloons fly 






The balloons lift 
the boy into the 
sky. 
The boys see the 
boy flying with 
the balloons. 
11% 2.57 
a This was the only foil based on a universal prediction that was generated under two of 
the three levels of Orientation. 
b Although this foil was used twice, participants only encountered this foil once in the two 
randomized sequences of targets and foils. 
 
3.1.3.3 Performance Measures 
For Yes/No tasks, there are a number of ways in which performance can be 
measured. We avoided performance measures that confound discriminability and 
response bias (e.g., percentage correct; Stanislaw & Todorov, 1999) in favor of indices 
that measure discriminability and bias directly and independently of each other. For 
Yes/No tasks, common measures of discriminability include d’, log d (Brown & White, 
2005; or log α, Macmillan & Creelman, 1990), and A’ (Pollack & Norman, 1964). 
Despite its widespread usage, A’ is generally not recommended as a measure of 
discriminability (Macmillan & Creelman, 1996; Macmillan, Rotello, & Miller, 2004; 
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Pastore, Crawley, Berens, & Skelly, 2003; Rhodes, Cowan, Parra, & Logie, 2018; 
Rotello, Masson, & Verde, 2008; Stanislaw & Todorov, 1999; Verde, Macmillan, & 
Rotello, 2006). Between d’ and log d, we chose the latter index because d’ is not 
recommended when the number of signal and noise trials are both small (i.e., N < 100 
each; Brown & White, 2005; Kadlec, 1999), whereas Brown and White (2005) 
recommend log d in such cases. Like d’, log d (Equation 1; Macmillan & Creelman, 
1990) can theoretically range in value from 0, corresponding to the complete inability to 
discriminate between signal and noise (i.e., chance performance), to positive infinity. We 
chose a complementary measure of response bias (i.e., criterion location), log b (Equation 
2; Macmillan & Creelman, 1990), that is independent of log d (Corwin, 1994; Macmillan 
& Creelman, 1990; Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988). For log b, negative values correspond to 
a liberal response bias (i.e., a greater tendency to say “Yes” than “No”) and positive 
values correspond to a conservative response bias (i.e., a greater tendency to say “No” 
than “Yes”). 






] - log10 [
 𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝐴𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑠 
(1− 𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝐴𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑠)
]}          (1) 
 






] + log10 [
 𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝐴𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑠 
(1− 𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝐴𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑠)
]}          (2) 
 
Lastly, log d is indeterminate or infinite when a pair of hit and false alarm rates 
contains an extreme value (i.e., either 1 or 0). Extreme pairs (i.e., pairs with at least one 
extreme value) were observed for 69% of all participants for Within/Within probes, 46% 
for Within/Across probes, and 36% for Across/Across probes. The frequency of extreme 
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pairs did not differ significantly between levels of Orientation for Within/Within, χ2(2) = 
1.78, p = .41, Within/Across, χ2(2) = 5.46, p = .07, nor Across/Across, χ2(2) = 2.18, p = 
.34. A loglinear transformation was applied to all hit and false alarm rates, regardless if 
they were extreme in value (Brown & White, 2005; Hautus, 1995; Kadlec, 1999; 
Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988; Stanislaw & Todorov, 1999). This transformation involves 
adding 0.5 to both the number of hits and false alarms and 1 to the number of signal and 
noise trials (Equation 3). 
Loglinear Transformation = 
#𝐻𝑖𝑡𝑠 + 0.5
#𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑠 + 1
 , 
#𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝐴𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑠 + 0.5
#𝑁𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑠 + 1
         (3) 
 
3.1.4 Procedure 
The procedure for Experiment 2 was nearly identical to those in Experiment 1, but 
with two exceptions. First, participants were not only randomly assigned to a level of 
Orientation, but also to one of two random sequences of targets and foils. Second, rather 
than writing down a prediction of what happens next in the film at each probe location, 
participants were given one of two options (i.e., either a target or a foil) and asked, “Does 
the statement below describe what will happen next?” Participants were instructed not to 
overthink their answers and to respond as quickly, but also as accurately, as possible. The 
experimental program recorded each participant’s confidence ratings, their response and 
response latency to probes (i.e., yes or no), and the exact moment(s) he or she pressed the 




For all analyses, the criterion for significance was an α level of .05. When 
corrections for multiple comparisons were used (e.g., the Bonferroni correction), the 
reported p values are adjusted and can be compared to .05. The violation of sphericity in 
mixed model ANOVAs was assessed with Mauchly’s sphericity test and if violated, 
degrees of freedom were adjusted using the Greenhouse-Geisser correction. As estimates 
of effect size, we report partial eta-squared (η2partial) for ANOVA effects and Cohen’s d 
for t-tests.  
3.2 Results 
 
3.2.1 Manipulation Check 
As in Experiment 1, we examined the degree to which situation and fine 
segmentation in Experiment 2 were related to normative segmentation data from previous 
segmentation studies using The Red Balloon (Kurby et al., 2014; Mumma & Durso, in 
revision). Additionally, we compared the segmentation rate of participants oriented to 
situations and those oriented to fine events in the present study. Prior to both analyses, 
the film was divided into 394 5-second time bins. Each time bin was coded for whether a 
participant reported at least one event boundary within the corresponding 5-second 
window of time. 
3.2.1.1 Segmentation Agreement  
Using the same analytical approach as in Experiment 1 (Lorch & Myers, 1990), 
we examined the extent to which the boundaries identified by participants in Experiment 
2 were related to the normative segmentation of another group of participants with the 
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same orientation. The likelihood of reporting a situation boundary in Experiment 2 was 
positively related to the normative probability of identifying a situation boundary (Mean 
β = 0.59, SE = 0.06), t(27) = 10.07, p < .001, d = 1.95, but not the normative probability 
of identifying a fine boundary (M = 0.09, SE = 0.06), t(27) = 1.34, p = 1, d = 0.25. The 
likelihood of reporting a fine boundary was positively related to both the normative 
probability of identifying a fine boundary (M = 0.26, SE = 0.07), t(27) = 3.93, p = .003, d 
= 0.74, as well as a situation boundary (M = 0.52, SE = 0.05), t(27) = 9.75, p < .001, d = 
1.84. 
3.2.1.2 Segmentation Rate 
Segmentation rate was analyzed with a 4 x 2 mixed ANOVA with Clip (1, 2, 3, 4) 
as a within-subjects factor and Orientation (Situation, Fine) as a between-subjects factor. 
As in Experiment 1, including Clip as a factor allowed us to determine whether the 
segmentation rate of participants with a situation-level orientation became fine-grained 
over time. This analysis revealed a significant main effect of Clip, F(2.20, 118.84) = 
10.52, p < .001, η2partial = .16, a significant main effect of Orientation, F(1, 54) = 12.95, p 
< .001, η2partial = .19, and no significant interaction between Clip and Orientation, F(2.20, 
118.84) = 1.82, p = .16, η2partial = .03 (Figure 7). Because differences between clips were 
not theoretically interesting, they were not explored further. Consistent with our 
expectations, the main effect of Orientation suggests that situations were segmented at a 
significantly lower rate (M = 0.20, SE = 0.03) than were fine events (M = 0.34, SE = 





Figure 7 – Mean segmentation rate as a function of Clip and Orientation. Error bars 
are the standard error of the mean. 
 
3.2.2 Neutral-Grain Segmentation 
Like situation segmentation, neutral-grain segmentation in Experiment 2 was 
positively related only to the normative probability of identifying a situation boundary (M 
= 0.61, SE = 0.05), t(27) = 11.42, p < .001, d = 2.16, and not the normative probability of 
identifying a fine boundary (M = -0.01, SE = 0.07), t(27) = -0.11, p = 1, d = -0.02. To 
compare the segmentation rates of participants under each Orientation, we analyzed 
segmentation rate with a 4 x 3 mixed ANOVA with Clip (1, 2, 3, 4) as a within-subjects 
factor and Orientation (Situation, Neutral, Fine) as a between-subjects factor. This analysis 






























a significant main effect of Orientation, F(2, 81) = 11.37, p < .001, η2partial = .22, and a 
significant interaction between Clip and Orientation, F(4.67, 189.3) = 2.60,  p = .03, η2partial 
= .06.  
Because our concern was whether differences in segmentation rate between the 
levels of Orientation changed over time, analysis of the interaction between Clip and 
Orientation focused on the simple main effect of Orientation for each of the four clips 
(using Bonferroni’s correction for multiple comparisons). These analyses suggested that 
in each of the four clips, participants with a fine orientation always segmented at a 
significantly higher rate than did participants with either a neutral-grain or a situation 
orientation (largest p = .04). Otherwise, the segmentation rate for participants with either 
a neutral-grain or a situation orientation did not differ for any clip (all ps = 1). Thus, 
differences in the segmentation rate of participants under different levels of Orientation 






Figure 8 – Mean segmentation rate as a function of Clip and Orientation. Error bars 
are the standard error of the mean. 
 
3.2.3 Confidence Ratings 
Mean confidence ratings were subjected to a 3 x 3 mixed ANOVA with Probe Type 
(Within/Within, Within/Across, Across/Across) as a within-subjects factor and Orientation 
(Situation, Neutral, Fine) as a between-subjects factor. This analysis revealed a significant 
main effect of Probe Type, F(2, 162) = 36.29, p < .001, η2partial = .31, but no significant 
effect of Orientation, F(2, 81) = 0.19, p = .83, η2partial = .01, nor interaction between Probe 
Type and Orientation, F(4, 162) = 0.38, p = .83, η2partial = .01. 
A trend analysis of Probe Type indicated a significant linear, F(1, 81) = 55.84, p < 
.001, η2partial = .41, as well as a quadratic trend, F(1, 81) = 11.33, p = .001, η
2































Thus, confidence in one’s ability to predict what happens next is greatest when within an 
ongoing situation and fine event (Within/Within; M = 3.70, SE = 0.09), but is similarly low 
when nearing either the end of a fine event in a situation (Within/Across; M = 3.34, SE = 




Figure 9 – Mean confidence rating as a function of Probe Type. Error bars are the 
standard error of the mean. 
 
3.2.3.1 Confidence and Segmentation 
To assess the relationship between confidence and the likelihood of segmentation, 




























Briefly, we estimated a logistic regression equation for each participant predicting his or 
her binary segmentation data following a probe from the corresponding confidence rating 
(standardized within each participant separately). To determine whether a participant 
segmented after each probe, we established a lenient response window (as probes may 
have been locally disruptive to event segmentation). Based on the mean response latency 
in the 10 seconds following boundary-probes (i.e., Within/Across and Across/Across 
probes), we included only key-presses that fell within 5.04 seconds ± 1.96 standard 
deviations (SD = 2.51) after each probe location. However, we excluded key-presses 
falling within 1.96 standard deviations before the next closest consensual boundary at the 
same level of Orientation (e.g., the next consensual situation boundary if segmenting the 
film into situations); for neutral-grain segmentation, we used the next closest consensual 
fine boundary. 
Logistic regression coefficients for 5 participants (18%) with a Neutral 
orientation, 2 participants (7%) with a Fine orientation, and 1 participant (4%) with a 
Situation orientation could not be estimated because these participants did not segment 
after any of the probes. Additionally, data for 1 participant with a Situation orientation 
was discarded for having a regression coefficient that was more than 3 standard 
deviations above the grand mean.  
Using the remaining 75 participants, a one-way ANOVA with Orientation as a 
between-subjects factor revealed no differences in the regression coefficients between 
levels of Orientation, F(2, 72) = 0.30, p = .75, η2partial = .01. Consequently, data were 
collapsed across levels of Orientation and collectively compared to zero using a one-
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sample t-test. The mean regression coefficient (M = -0.13, SE = 0.07) was less than zero 
but not significantly so, t(74) = -1.72, p = .089, d = -0.20. Thus, in Experiments 1 and 2, 
we obtained evidence for a negative relationship between confidence in one’s ability to 
predict the future and the likelihood of reporting an event boundary in the near future. 
However, this finding was not statistically reliable in Experiment 2. 
3.2.4 Discriminability 
Log d values were analyzed with a 3 x 3 mixed ANOVA with Probe Type 
(Within/Within, Within/Across, Across/Across) as a within-subjects factor and 
Orientation (Situation, Neutral, Fine) as a between-subjects factor. This analysis revealed 
a significant main effect of Probe Type, F(2, 162) = 8.23, p < .001, η2partial = .09, but no 
significant effect of Orientation, F(2, 81) = 1.06, p = .35, η2partial = .03, nor interaction 
between Probe Type and Orientation, F(4, 162) = 0.72, p = .58, η2partial = .02. 
Trend analysis of Probe Type indicated a significant linear, F(1, 81) = 16.84, p < 
.001, η2partial = .17, but not a significant quadratic trend, F(1, 81) = 1.26, p = .27, η
2
partial = 
.02. Thus, the ability to discriminate between targets and foils was greatest when within a 
situation and fine event (Within/Within; M = 0.22, SE = 0.03), worse when nearing the 
end of a fine event during an ongoing situation (Within/Across; M = 0.18, SE = 0.03), 
and even worse when nearing the end of both a fine event and situation (Across/Across; 





Figure 10 – Log d, a measure of discriminability, as a function of Probe Type. Error 
bars are the standard error of the mean. 
 
3.2.5 Reaction Time  
For each participant, we computed the mean reaction time of correct responses for 
each level of Probe Type. We excluded the data for one participant who did not make any 
correct responses to Within/Across probes. Mean reaction times were subjected to a 3 x 3 
mixed ANOVA with Probe Type (Within/Within, Within/Across, Across/Across) as a 
within-subjects factor and Orientation (Situation, Neutral, Fine) as a between-subjects 
factor. This analysis revealed a significant main effect of Probe Type, F(1.84, 146.9) = 
13.55, p < .001, η2partial = .15, but no significant effect of Orientation, F(2, 80) = 1.84, p = 
.17, η2partial = .04, nor interaction between Probe Type and Orientation, F(3.67, 146.9) = 













Trend analysis of Probe Type indicated a significant quadratic trend, F(1, 80) = 
21.22,  p < .001, η2partial = .21, but not a linear trend, F(1, 80) = 0.19, p = .66, η
2
partial = .002. 
The quadratic trend suggests that reaction time to a probe is slower when nearing the end 
of a fine event in a situation (Within/Across; M = 3.42 seconds, SE = 0.22) than when 
within a fine event and a situation (Within/Within; M = 2.42, SE = 0.15) or nearing the end 
of a fine event and a situation (Across/Across; M = 2.50, SE = 0.14; Figure 11). 
 
 
Figure 11 – Mean reaction time for correct responses to probes as a function of 
Probe Type. Error bars are the standard error of the mean. 
 
3.2.6 Response Bias 
Log b values were subjected to a 3 x 3 mixed ANOVA with Probe Type 


















(Situation, Neutral, Fine) as a between-subjects factor. This analysis revealed a significant 
main effect of Probe Type, F(1.82, 147) = 23.26, p < .001, η2partial = .22, but no significant 
effect of Orientation, F(2, 81) = 0.55, p = .58, η2partial = .01, nor interaction between Probe 
Type and Orientation, F(3.63, 147) = 1.74, p = .15, η2partial = .04. 
Trend analysis of Probe Type indicated a significant linear, F(1, 81) = 35.25, p < 
.001, η2partial = .30, but not a significant quadratic trend, F(1, 81) = 0.01, p = .94, η
2
partial < 
.001. The tendency to respond “yes” to probes was strongest when within a situation and 
fine-grained event (Within/Within; M = -0.36, SE = 0.03), weaker when nearing the end of 
a fine-grained event in a situation (Within/Across; M = -0.20, SE = 0.03), and even weaker 
when nearing the end of both a fine-grained event and situation (Across/Across; M = -0.05, 
SE = 0.04; Figure 12). In Appendix B, the interested reader can find comparable analyses 






Figure 12 – Log b, a measure of response bias, as a function of Probe Type. Error 
bars are the standard error of the mean. 
 
3.3 Discussion 
Like Experiment 1, Experiment 2 provided some evidence for the general 
mechanisms of EST but failed to support the hypothesis that the hierarchical structure of 
event segmentation is attributable to the differential predictive accuracies of event models 
on different timescales. Regarding the former, we observed that one’s confidence in their 
ability to predict what happens next was negatively related to the likelihood of perceiving 
an event boundary in the near future (although not significantly so, p = .089). Regarding 
the latter, both the confidence in and the accuracy of one’s prediction varied as a function 














Unlike Experiment 1, however, confidence and accuracy were not affected by the 
levels of Probe Type in the same way. Confidence was highest during a fine event in an 
ongoing situation (Within/Within) and was equally low near the end of a fine event in an 
ongoing situation (Within/Across) and near the end of a fine event and the current 
situation (Across/Across). This replicates the effect of Probe Type on confidence ratings 
observed in Experiment 1 and is consistent with our expectations for fine segmentation. 
Predictive accuracy, on the other hand, was highest within a fine event in an ongoing 
situation (Within/Within), worse when nearing the end of a fine event in an ongoing 
situation (Within/Across), and even worse when nearing the end of both a fine event and 
situation (Across/Across). Given that accuracy and confidence diverged only at 
Within/Across probes, which participants took longer to answer correctly than either 
Within/Within or Across/Across probes, it is possible that participants were able to 
deduce the correct answer. This reveals a potential weakness of using Yes/No decision 
tasks to assess predictive accuracy when comprehending ongoing activity (e.g., Huff et 
al., 2014; Zacks et al., 2011). At the same time, it might also suggest that when given a 
possible future, one’s current fine-event model can be used to infer the next fine event in 
an ongoing situation, but not when the next fine event is part of a new situation. 
Lastly, we found that response bias was most liberal during a fine event in an 
ongoing situation (Within/Within), less so when nearing the end of a fine event in an 
ongoing situation (Within/Across), and even less so when nearing the end of a fine event 
and the current situation (Across/Across). Although we did not hypothesize how response 
bias might be affected by the levels of Probe Type, this result is similar to one obtained 
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by Zacks et al. (2011), who found that response bias was more liberal within an event 
than near the end of an event.  
Like Experiment 1, the failure to observe an effect of Orientation on confidence 
or accuracy cannot be attributed to a failure to manipulate Orientation. Situation and fine 
segmentation were differentially related to the normative situation and fine segmentation 
of a different group of participants who segmented The Red Balloon. Moreover, 
situations (and neutral-grain events) were segmented significantly less frequently than 
were fine events throughout the entire film. 
Otherwise, neutral-grain segmentation in Experiment 2 was indistinguishable 
from situation segmentation, which contradicts our earlier finding that participants may 
have preferentially segmented the film into small events. Given that Experiments 1 and 2 
only differed with respect to the prediction task, this shift in segmentation grain may have 
been a response to task demands, to which neutral-grain segmentation is sensitive. For 
example, Cohen and Ebbesen (1979) had participants freely segment a video of an actor 
performing a task with either the goal of forming an impression of the actor’s personality 
or learning the actor’s task. Participants who segmented to form an impression of the 
actor produced larger segments than did participants who segmented to learn the task. 
Lassiter, Geers, Apple, and Beers (2000), however, found that having either goal (i.e., 
forming an impression or learning the task) resulted in coarser-grained segmentation than 
having no specific goal during segmentation and found no difference in segmentation rate 
between participants with either goal. 
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Like Experiment 1, the results of Experiment 2 also suggest that participants had 
event models of activity only at the fine-grained level, despite the fact that segmentation 
clearly varied as a function of Orientation. In support, the effect of Probe Type on 

















CHAPTER 4.       GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
 To behave adaptively in our everyday lives, it is crucial that we recognize when 
the current situation ends and a new situation begins. Central to this imperative is the 
issue of how we form and modify our internal representations of situations, which are one 
of the fundamental mediating mechanisms between external situations and psychological 
outcomes (Parrigon et al., 2017, p. 670). A review of several related but largely 
unintegrated literatures (e.g., social psychology, engineering psychology, and narrative 
comprehension) suggests that our representations of situations are bounded, hierarchical, 
multifaceted, and future-oriented (at least for experienced situations). We argued that 
each of these properties is embodied by Event Segmentation Theory (EST; Zacks et al., 
2007) and moreover, that EST can provide a novel framework for understanding how 
these properties coalesce to give rise to our representations of situations. 
In the present studies, we were concerned with how EST might account for one of 
these properties in particular - the hierarchical structure of our representations of 
situations. EST also claims that our representation of ongoing activity is hierarchical, 
such that people simultaneously perceive a series of fine events unfolding within coarse 
events. Specifically, people maintain internal models of events unfolding on different 
timescales simultaneously in working memory. Each “event model” strives to predict the 
state of the world in the near future and will continue to represent ongoing activity as 
long as its predictions are consistent with sensory input. However, when large 
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discrepancies between predictions and reality emerge, the current event model is updated, 
giving rise to the experience of a perceptual boundary between events. 
According to EST, the hierarchy of event models in working memory arises 
because event models maintained on separate timescales can differ in the amount of 
prediction error they experience; specifically, when a fine event boundary occurs within 
the boundaries of a coarse event, the coarse event model should experience less 
prediction error in that moment than the fine event model. We directly tested this 
hypothesis by orienting participants to event models on either the situation (i.e., coarse) 
or fine level of activity in a film and assessed their confidence and predictive accuracy at 
moments when both variables should depend upon the event model being interrogated. 
These moments were either during a fine event in an ongoing situation (Within/Within), 
when nearing the end of a fine event in an ongoing situation (Within/Across), or when 
nearing the end of both a fine event and situation (Across/Across). 
Because the present studies were the first to simultaneously assess confidence, 
predictive accuracy, and overt segmentation, we also tested several critical but 
unexamined hypotheses regarding these three variables. Specifically, EST claims that 
event models are updated in response to spikes in prediction error, with the magnitude of 
prediction error being related to one’s subjective uncertainty about the future (Zacks et 
al., 2011). However, no study has tested whether confidence and predictive accuracy are 
predictive of subsequent segmentation.  
In Experiment 1, we found that the more confident one was in their ability to 
predict what would happen next in the film, the more consistent his or her prediction was 
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with what actually happened in the near future. Furthermore, the more consistent one’s 
prediction was with what happened next in the film, the less likely he or she was to 
perceive an event boundary in the near future. In both Experiments 1 and 2, we observed 
that confidence in one’s ability to predict what would happen next in a narrative film was 
negatively related to the likelihood of perceiving an event boundary in the near future 
(although this effect was not reliable in Experiment 2). Thus, we obtained novel and, in 
one case, somewhat replicable evidence for the general mechanisms of EST. 
 Although we found support for the general mechanisms of EST, it appears that 
these mechanisms were operating only in event models of activity at the fine level. In 
Experiments 1 and 2, confidence in one’s ability to predict what would happen next 
followed a pattern expected for fine segmentation. Specifically, participants were most 
confident in their ability to predict the future during a fine event in an ongoing situation 
(Within/Within) but were equally lower in confidence either when nearing the end of a 
fine event in an ongoing situation (Within/Across) or when nearing the end of a fine 
event and a situation (Across/Across). This pattern suggests that confidence was varying 
as a function of whether a fine event boundary was imminent or not.  
Regarding predictive accuracy, we used complementary operationalizations (i.e., 
the “three-prong method”; Magliano & Graesser, 1991) to ensure that our conclusions 
would not be endemic to one approach. Indeed, our two measures of predictive accuracy 
largely converged on the same pattern that, like confidence, was consistent with fine 
segmentation; Participants were most accurate at predicting what happened next in the 
film during a fine event in a situation (Within/Within) and were less accurate when 
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nearing the end of a fine event and situation (Across/Across). As Kurby & Zacks (2012) 
observe, verbal protocols and behavioral measures (e.g., reading time) often correspond 
to one another, yet when they do diverge, it is because the former is less sensitive to 
subtle changes in event structure than the latter. Indeed, when nearing the end of a fine 
event during an ongoing situation (Within/Across), our two measures of predictive 
accuracy diverged. In Experiment 1, predictive accuracy (i.e., consistency) was just as 
poor at these moments as it was when nearing the end of a fine event and situation 
(Across/Across), replicating the pattern observed for confidence in both Experiments 1 
and 2. In Experiment 2, predictive accuracy (i.e., discriminability) at these moments was 
worse than during a fine event in a situation (Within/Within) but better than when nearing 
the end of a fine event and situation (Across/Across). Taken together, our two measures 
of predictive accuracy suggest that people are less likely to know what happens next 
when nearing the end of a fine event than when within a fine event (Experiment 1). 
However, when given a possible future (i.e., a target or foil; Experiment 2), people are 
able to identify the correct answer with a moderate degree of accuracy, but only if the 
next fine event is part of same ongoing situation. This might suggest that one’s current 
fine-event model can be used to infer the next fine event in an ongoing situation, which 
was only intimated when we assessed predictive accuracy using a Yes/No decision task. 
The present studies replicate previous observations that both confidence (Zacks et 
al., 2011) and predictive accuracy (Eisenberg et al., 2018; Reynolds et al., 2007; Zacks et 
al., 2011) are higher within an event than at the end of an event. Critically, the present 
studies suggest that this may only be true for our representations of fine events, but not 
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coarse events (e.g., situations). Despite evidence that participants only had fine event 
models in the present studies, however, their overt segmentation clearly depended on 
their orientation to activity in the film. Across Experiments 1 and 2, we consistently 
found that situation segmentation was related only to the normative situation 
segmentation of a separate group of participants whereas fine segmentation was related to 
both normative fine and situation segmentation. Moreover, participants who were 
oriented to situations segmented the film more coarsely than did participants oriented to 
fine activity (although this finding was not reliable in Experiment 1). 
Interestingly, the grain at which people naturally segmented the film (i.e., neutral-
grain segmentation) differed between the two studies; in Experiment 1, neutral-grain 
segmentation was similar to fine segmentation, but in Experiment 2, neutral-grain 
segmentation was indistinguishable from situation segmentation. That the preferred 
granularity of segmentation differed systematically between the two studies suggests that 
the natural grain may have been dictated by task demands (e.g., Cohen & Ebbesen, 1979; 
Lassiter et al., 2000), although it is not obvious why one prediction task would engender 
fine but not situation-level segmentation (and vice versa). Importantly, whether 
participants naturally oriented to the fine or situation level of activity was unrelated to 
their confidence and predictive accuracy; in both cases, their performance was consistent 
with having fine-event models. 
We observed a divergence between how observers segment ongoing activity and 
the event models of activity that observers maintain. Specifically, the present studies 
found no evidence that people maintain coarse-event models of situations; regardless of 
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how one was oriented to activity in the film, his or her confidence and predictive 
accuracy depended entirely on the structure of fine events. This observation conflicts 
with a premise of EST, which is that event boundaries identified during segmentation 
correspond to an event model being updated, with fine boundaries marking the advent of 
a new fine-event model and coarse boundaries marking the advent of a new coarse-event 
model. Like EST, we believe that fine segmentation may indeed reflect the updating of 
fine-event models, but unlike EST, we propose that coarse segmentation may instead 
reflect how observers group fine events online rather than the updating of coarse event 
models per se (Zacks et al, 2007, p. 286). Accordingly, we argue that when people 
overtly segment activity into situations, they are reporting each time they perceive that 
one meaningful sequence of fine events (e.g., an episode) has ended and a new sequence 
has begun. 
We argue that our interpretation is a more parsimonious view of the hierarchical 
structure of event segmentation than that of EST. EST proposes that people maintain a 
hierarchy of event models simultaneously in working memory (Radvansky & Zacks, 
2011; Radvansky & Zacks, 2014; Zacks et al., 2007). On any given timescale, there is 
only one active event model, but at any given moment, there are multiple active event 
models on different timescales (Radvansky & Zacks, 2014). Yet, working memory is 
limited in how much information it can maintain actively and how long it can maintain 
that information (Baddeley, 2003). Thus, maintaining multiple event models might incur 
a considerable cost given how difficult it is to predict the future (e.g., Wickens, 2015), let 
alone make n (perhaps as many as six; Radvansky & Zacks, 2014) simultaneous 
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predictions for timescales ranging from seconds to tens of minutes. Again, we advocate 
for a simpler view – we do maintain event models of finer units of activity and these 
models attempt to predict the very near future. Rather than perceiving an endless 
succession of fine events, however, we actively organize a sequence of fine events in 
terms of a single coherent situation. 
Our interpretation is also compatible with broad evidence that people tend to 
perceive coarse events as being composed of fine events. We have observed that the 
boundaries people tend to identify between situations per se are a subset of the 
boundaries that people tend to identify between fine events (Mumma & Durso, in 
revision), consistent with evidence that coarse-event boundaries tend to be a subset of 
fine-event boundaries, regardless of whether segmentation grain is varied between 
observers (e.g., Hanson & Hirst, 1989; Newtson, 1973) or within observers (e.g., Hard et 
al., 2006; Zacks et al., 2001). Indeed, the temporal alignment of coarse and fine 
boundaries is a highly replicable characteristic of event segmentation (e.g., Hard et al., 
2006; Kurby & Zacks, 2011; Kurby & Zacks, 2012; Sargent et al., 2013; Zacks, 2004; 
Zacks et al., 2001; Zacks et al., 2006; Zacks et al., 2009; Zacks et al., 2010) and, in some 
cases, reflects the attainment of higher level goals and lower level goals, respectively 
(Kurby & Zacks, 2019; Zacks et al., 2001). Moreover, the boundaries of coarse events 
also tend to “enclose” fine events (Hard et al., 2006; Hard et al., 2011; Zacks et al., 
2009). That is, coarse boundaries tend to fall just slightly after the nearest fine unit 
boundary in time, which suggests that fine events are subsumed by coarse events (Kurby 
& Zacks, 2008). 
91 
 
If coarse event boundaries mark the end of one group of related fine events and 
the start of a new group, it is reasonable to expect that processing coarse boundaries 
should be more difficult than fine boundaries. Converging behavioral and 
neurophysiological evidence supports this hypothesis. As discussed earlier, brain 
responses are generally larger at coarse than fine event boundaries (Kurby & Zacks, 
2018; Speer et al., 2007; Zacks et al., 2001; Zacks et al., 2006), which suggests that 
coarse boundaries engender greater processing demands than do fine boundaries (Zacks 
et al., 2001). Using electrophysiological techniques, Delogu, Drenhaus, and Corcker 
(2018) found that coarse boundaries, which marked the start of a new unrelated activity 
in a story (e.g., jogging versus dishwashing), elicited a stronger N400 (reflecting the 
retrieval of lexical semantic information) and P600 (reflecting situation model updating) 
response than did fine boundaries, which marked the start of a new event that continued 
the current activity in a story (e.g., drying dishes after washing dishes). 
That coarse boundaries are more difficult to process than fine boundaries is also 
evidenced by behavioral data, such as dwell times. When advancing through a flip book 
depicting an everyday activity, people look longest at coarse boundaries, less at 
intermediate boundaries, and even less at fine boundaries (Hard et al., 2011; Kosie & 
Baldwin, 2019). Moreover, this effect can only be partially explained by the magnitude of 
low-level physical changes occurring at boundaries, which suggests that conceptual 
changes may also contribute to dwell time above and beyond perceptual changes 
occurring at boundaries. In the present studies, predictive accuracy near the end of a fine 
event and situation (Across/Across) similarly suggests that processing the end of a 
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situation is more difficult than processing the end of a fine event in an ongoing situation. 
Although Experiment 1 revealed that people are less likely to know what will happen in 
the next fine event than later in the current fine event, they are better at identifying what 
happens in the next fine event as long as it is part of the same situation; if the next fine 
event is part of a new situation, however, predictive accuracy drops to near chance levels. 
Thinking of coarse grain (i.e., situation) segmentation as the online chunking of 
fine event models suggests an important role for event knowledge (e.g., knowing what 
events precede or follow one another or are part of achieving a larger goal). When 
participants can choose their preferred grain of segmentation, having knowledge about an 
activity or actor tends to engender coarser-grained segmentation (e.g. Bläsing, 2015; 
Graziano et al., 1988; Levine et al., 2017; Markus et al., 1985; Massad et al., 1979; 
Newberry & Bailey, 2019; Newtson, 1973; Wilder, 1978a, Wilder, 1978b). Moreover, 
Hard, Meyer, and Baldwin (2018) demonstrated that the perception of coarse but not fine 
boundaries (Hard et al., 2011; Kosie & Baldwin, 2019) emerges after learning the higher-
level structure of activity. Hard et al. (2018) created coarse events or “actions” by 
randomly selecting and ordering three “small motion events” (e.g., stacking, poking, or 
drinking) from a larger corpora of such events. One group of participants was exposed to 
the statistical regularities of small motion events (i.e., how they form larger actions) 
while another other group remained naïve. Later, participants advanced through a 
flipbook of actions at their own pace while their dwell times were recorded. All 
participants looked longer at slides depicting boundaries between small motion events 
than slides depicting within-event content. However, only participants who had acquired 
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knowledge of the statistical regularities of small motion events slowed down at 
boundaries separating actions (i.e., recurring patterns of small motion events).  
Lastly, if grouping a series of fine events into a coarse event depends upon event 
knowledge, then reducing the availability of this knowledge should selectively impair 
coarse but not fine grain segmentation. Converging neuropsychological evidence 
supports this hypothesis. For example, Zalla, Labruyère, and Georgieff (2013) observed 
that individuals with mental retardation or learning disabilities were significantly worse 
than typically developing controls at identifying prototypical coarse but not fine 
boundaries, owing to the reduced effect of conceptual knowledge during online 
segmentation. Moreover, patients with psychiatric (e.g., schizophrenia; Zalla, Verlut, 
Franck, Puzenat, & Sirigu, 2004) or neurologic disorders (e.g., frontal lobe damage; 
Zacks, Kurby, Landazabal, Kruger, & Grafman, 2016; Zalla, Pradat-Diehl, & Sirigu, 
2003) associated with frontal cortex dysfunction are also selectively impaired at 
identifying coarse but not fine boundaries, relative to normal controls. Notably, the 
frontal cortex contains subregions that represent knowledge of social events and routine 
event sequences (Zacks et al., 2016) and are also important for planning and executing 
complex behavior (Zalla et al., 2003).  
4.1 Limitations 
 Because the present studies used a narrative feature length film, there are potential 
limits on the generalizability of our findings. For example, filmmakers use certain 
conventions to tell stories (e.g., cuts, framing, or music; Zacks & Magliano, 2011), which 
are typically not part of the situations we encounter in everyday life. Thus, how 
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participants understood the situations in The Red Balloon may reflect the influence of 
these conventions (e.g., because of how they can powerfully direct attention; Magliano et 
al., 2014). However, there is evidence that we form representations of situations while 
observing less-scripted activities (e.g., a first-person shooter game; Magliano et al., 2014) 
or participating in interactive events (e.g., in actual or virtual reality environments; 
Radvansky & Copeland, 2006; Radvansky, Krawietz, & Tamplin, 2011) that are similar 
to those formed in more structured contexts (e.g., reading or watching a narrative film; 
Magliano et al., 2014). 
Furthermore, participants in the present study attempted to understand another 
person’s situations, rather than their own personal situation. Ultimately, our goal is to 
understand the latter, although we suspect there is much overlap between the processes 
underlying each. For example, people are accurate at perceiving the situations of others; 
when rating the characteristics of a situation based on limited information about that 
situation (e.g., who or what was present and where the situation occurred), there is 
considerable agreement between raters in situ (i.e., people rating their own description of 
a situation they recently experienced) and raters ex situ (i.e., people rating the 
descriptions of situations provided by raters in situ; Sherman et al., 2010; Sherman, Nave, 
& Funder, 2013; Rauthmann et al., 2014; Rauthmann & Sherman, 2017). Moreover, 
people tend to identify the same coarse and fine event boundaries when segmenting an 
activity filmed from either the first or third-person perspective (Swallow et al., 2018). 
Thus, observers arrive at similar representations of situations (e.g., their characteristics 
and how they unfold) regardless if they are experiencing or observing a situation. 
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Furthermore, people are often active participants in situations, rather than passive 
observers like participants in the present studies. Therefore, one might doubt whether 
knowing how observers understand ongoing activity translates to how people understand 
the activities of which they are a part. Although there is a lack of research on event model 
construction during live events (Richmond & Zacks, 2017), there appears to be overlap 
between the systems for understanding activity (i.e., event cognition) and the systems for 
producing activity (Bailey et al., 2013) and perhaps even a common representational 
format (Hommel et al., 2001; Kurby & Zacks, 2008). 
Lastly, we assessed predictive accuracy in both studies using probes, which 
temporarily halted the movie to assess a participant’s confidence and predictive accuracy. 
There are theoretical reasons to believe that probes may have been disruptive (i.e., as 
interruptions; Foroughi, Werner, Barragán, & Boehm-Davis, 2015). Indeed, we observed 
data suggesting that the effect of orientation on overt segmentation was minimal shortly 
after probes, but our global manipulation checks strongly suggested that this effect was 
temporary. Nonetheless, less invasive assessments of predictive accuracy (e.g., via eye-
movements; Eisenberg & Zacks, 2016) may be preferable in future research so as not to 
disrupt segmentation. 
4.2 Conclusions and Future Directions 
In summary, the present studies suggest that situation (i.e., coarse) segmentation 
may reflect how observers chunk a series of fine events together into a single situation 
whereas fine segmentation may reflect the updating of fine-event models. Not only is this 
interpretation consistent with broad evidence that our perceptions of coarse events are 
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built from fine events but it is also consistent with the view of situations as episodes of 
activity, which is found across different literatures that study the representations people 
form of situations (e.g., Deutsch et al., 1994; Flach et al., 2004; Forgas, 1976; Radvansky 
& Wyer, 1999). Lastly, the findings from the present studies suggest future directions for 
both application and theory. 
4.2.1 Applied Directions 
Regarding the practical implications of the present studies, we suggest that event 
segmentation be assessed in operators of dynamic environments, given the importance of 
tracking and connecting events over time to their situation awareness (Durso et al., 2007; 
Sarter & Woods, 1999; Woods, 1988). For example, Christoffersen et al. (2007) used a 
modified version of the event marking paradigm to elicit the meaningful events that 
anesthesiologists perceived during a simulated telemetry monitoring task. In dynamic 
environments, however, it is particularly important to understand how operators segment 
ongoing activity in real time, rather than in a video playback. Several studies suggest that 
the hierarchical segmentation of ongoing activity may be evinced by eye-movements 
(Eisenberg & Zacks, 2016; Hard et al., 2011; Kosie & Baldwin, 2019), which could 
provide a less invasive measure of event segmentation than the traditional event marking 
paradigm (Newtson, 1973).  
Moreover, not only would assessing event segmentation be important for 
understanding an individual’s situation awareness, but also the collective situation 
awareness of a team of operators. Several studies have shown that certain psychological 
outcomes (e.g., memory and the efficiency of action execution; Bailey et al., 2013; Kurby 
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& Zacks, 2011; Zacks et al., 2006) are related to how normatively one segments an 
activity, suggesting that normative segmentation is related to efficient cognitive 
functioning. In the context of a team managing a situation (e.g., medical responders 
resuscitating a patient in cardiac arrest), it is plausible that the extent to which the online 
segmentation of different teammates is coordinated would be positively related to team 
outcomes (e.g., performance). 
4.2.2 Theoretical Directions 
Regarding future theoretical directions, the present studies raise at least three 
important questions. The first is that if situations are indeed perceived as chunks of fine 
events, then what mechanism(s) may underly this chunking? Our previous discussion of 
the relationship between coarse and fine events strongly suggests that event knowledge 
contributes to how observers group fine events into coarse events. More specifically, 
several studies suggest that knowledge about the goal and sub-goal relationships between 
events can give rise to the hierarchical structure of event segmentation (e.g., Kurby & 
Zacks, 2018; Zacks et al., 2001), although such knowledge is not always necessary (Hard 
et al., 2006). That the knowledge of goals and sub-goals may structure our representation 
of activity resonates with a recent conceptualization of situations in the social psychology 
literature. In a comprehensive review of the definitions of situations, taxonomies of 
situations, and interrelationships of situations, people, and behavior, Yang, Read, and 
Miller (2009, p. 1018) concluded that “…the essence of a situation is its affordance of 
human goals, and that situations are largely characterized by two specific principles of 
goal processes (what happened, is happening, or might happen to people’s goals) and 
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goal contents (the specific goals afforded in the situation).” Inferring the goals that are 
afforded by a situation (and the behaviors of people in the situation that are related to 
those goals; Magliano, Skowronski, Britt, Güss, & Forsythe, 2008; Rauthmann, 2016) 
could be a powerful mechanism for organizing a coherent sequence of fine events. Thus, 
knowledge of goals may facilitate the organization of fine events into coarse events in 
general, but also into situations specifically. 
The second question concerns whether our representations of fine and coarse 
events interact with each other; specifically, are fine events simply atomic or primitive 
things (see Zacks & Tversky, 2001, p. 4) that we group into larger events or do fine 
events themselves depend on how one is chunking activity? That coarse grain, but not 
fine grain segmentation, can be selectively impaired would seem to support the idea that 
fine events can be perceived independently of coarse events (e.g., Zacks et al., 2016; 
Zalla et al., 2003; Zalla et al., 2004; Zalla et al., 2013). Moreover, the boundaries 
between fine events are more strongly related to lower-level perceptual changes (e.g., in 
the direction or speed of an object or actor) than are the boundaries between coarse 
events (Hard et al., 2006; Newtson, et al., 1977; Zacks, 2004; Zacks et al., 2009), 
suggesting that fine events may also have a less conceptual basis than coarse events. 
However, in domains such as aviation or driving, an inexperienced operator placed in the 
same situation as an experienced operator may not perceive an event whereas the 
experienced operator does (e.g., a hazardous event; Durso, Dattel, & Pop, 2018). This 
would suggest that fine events may not be perceptual primitives but rather, do sometimes 
require knowledge to be perceived. 
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A final question is whether people ever maintain multiple event models 
simultaneously. It would be premature to conclude that we only have fine-event models 
of activity from the present two studies alone. One possibility is that our findings are 
limited to the kind activity portrayed in The Red Balloon – extended, unfamiliar, 
naturalistic activity. It remains possible that in highly structured (e.g., ritualistic) or 
routine situations, individuals do maintain fine- and coarse-event models simultaneously 
because prediction on more than one timescale is tenable. Therefore, future research 
should strive to uncover the conditions under which people do maintain multiple event 
















APPENDIX A: PREDICTIONS AT PROBE LOCATIONS 
Table 5 – Predictions and their frequency (f) at Probe 1 (Within/Across) for each 
level of Orientation. 
Situation Neutral Fine 
Prediction f Prediction f Prediction f 
The boy pets the cat, 
then walks away. 
7 
The boy continues 
walking. 
6 
The boy and the cat 
walk off together. 
12 
The boy continues 
walking. 
6 
The boy and the cat 
walk off together. 
5 
The boy continues 
walking. 
6 
The boy continues 
interacting with the 
cat. 
5 
The boy continues 
interacting with the cat. 
3 
The boy continues 
interacting with the cat. 
3 
A new person 
appears. 
4 
The boy pets the cat, 
then walks away. 
3 The cat runs away. 3 
The cat follows the 
boy. 
4 The cat follows the boy. 3 A new person appears. 2 
The cat runs away. 3 The cat runs away. 3 
The child walks out of 
frame. 
1 
The boy will pet the 
cat and the camera 
will shift focus onto a 
new character. 
1 The boy walks home. 2 




Someone else appears 
on screen. 
1 
Transition from this 
scene to another. 
1 
-- -- 
The child wanders the 
street and his/her 
parents go looking for 
him/her. 
1 He will go home. 1 
-- -- 
The same activity 
continues until a new 
one comes up. 
1 -- -- 
-- -- 
Someone will come to 
pick up the child and 
the dog. 
1 -- -- 
-- -- 
The main character gets 
introduced? 








Table 6 – Predictions and their frequency (f) at Probe 2 (Within/Across) for each 
level of Orientation. 
Situation Neutral Fine 
Prediction f Prediction f Prediction f 
The boy continues 
walking with the 
balloon. 
24 
The boy continues 
walking with the 
balloon. 
21 
The boy continues 
walking with the 
balloon. 
16 
The boy loses the 
balloon. 
2 
The boy takes the 
balloon home. 
4 
The boy continues 
walking. 
4 
The boy walks home 
with the balloon. 
2 
The boy loses the 
balloon. 
3 
The boy goes back 
to the cat. 
3 
The boy takes the 
red balloon with him 
to school. 
1 
He will eventually 
meet others who will 
try to take the 
balloon from him as 
he will try to recover 
the balloon. 
1 
The boy gives his 
balloon to someone 
else. 
2 
The boy is going to 
play with the 
balloon. 
1 







-- -- -- -- 
He will hold the red 
balloon and go to 
his house or back 
where he came 
from. 
1 
-- -- -- -- 
The boy will get 
down and drop his 
balloon. 
1 
-- -- -- -- 
The boy will land 
with the balloon 
which might float 
away. 
1 
-- -- -- -- 













Table 7 – Predictions and their frequency (f) at Probe 3 (Across/Across) for each 
level of Orientation. 
Situation Neutral Fine 
Prediction f Prediction f Prediction f 
The boy catches up to 
the bus. 
8 
The boy chases after 
the bus. 
10 
The boy catches up 
to the bus. 
7 
The boy chases after 
the bus. 
8 The boy runs home. 3 
The boy runs to his 
destination. 
6 
The boy keeps 
running. 
3 
The boy loses the 
balloon. 
2 
The boy chases 
after the bus. 
5 
The boy does not catch 
the bus. 
2 
The boy runs to his 
destination. 
2 
The boy does not 
catch the bus. 
3 
The boy reaches his 
destination. 
2 
The boy tries to catch 
another bus. 
2 The boy runs home. 3 
He runs home with his 
balloon. 
1 
The child reaches one 
of his destinations. 
1 
The boy loses the 
balloon. 
2 
He will get tired and 
give up. 1 
The boy continues 
running down the 
sidewalk. 
1 
The boy runs into 
something or gets 
hit. 
1 
Boy rounds a corner. 
1 
The boy would be able 
to catch up the 
transport and get it on. 
1 
Child runs so fast 
the balloon begins 
to make him float. 
1 
The kid falls/gets 
tired/gets injured. 
1 
He runs until he gets 
tired. 
1 
The boys running 
causes him to upset 
people and causes a 
scene in which the 
balloon pops. 
1 
The boy runs to a door 
and enters the building. 
1 
Boy stops in a 
store/shop. 
1 
The boy goes into a 
building. 
1 
The boy will find some 
form of alternative 
transportation. 
1 
The kid doesn't catch 
the bus and he starts to 
walk to school. 
1 -- -- 
Somebody helps the 
boy. 
1 
The boy fails to catch 
the bus. 
1 -- -- 
-- -- 
The child will get hurt 
in some way. 
1 -- -- 
-- -- 
He turns on a corner or 
runs into someone. 
1 -- -- 
-- -- 
The boy encounters 
something (the bus he 










Table 8 – Predictions and their frequency (f) at Probe 4 (Within/Within) for each 
level of Orientation. 
Situation Neutral Fine 
Prediction f Prediction f Prediction f 
The man walks the 
boy home. 
5 




The man and boy part 
ways. 
5 
The boy walks himself 
home. 
4 
The man walks the boy 
home. 
5 
The boy walks 
himself home. 
4 




The man and boy part 
ways. 
2 
The man and the boy 
walk into a building. 
3 
The balloon will pop. 2 
The man and the boy 
stop to get food. 
2 
The man and the boy 
walk into a store. 
3 
The man and boy part 
ways. 
2 
The man and the boy 
walk into a store. 
2 The balloon will pop. 2 
The man and the boy 
stop to get food. 
2 
The man and boy will 
become friends. 
1 
The boy goes to the 
man's house. 
2 
The man and the boy 
walk into a building. 
2 
Gentleman with the 
booklet will follow him. 
1 
The man walks the 
boy home. 
2 
The man and the boy 
walk into a store. 
2 
The boy and man are 
going to find somewhere 
inside to go. 
1 
He continues to look 
for someone or get 
help since he is lost. 
1 
He goes to the old 
man's house. 
1 
The boy again left the 
balloon to the old 
person. 
1 
The boy keeps 
finding others to keep 
his red balloon. 
1 
The man from the 
window will follow 
the boy and his new 
friend. 
1 
They will walk together, 
but the balloon may be 
taken away by wind. 
1 
The man invites the 
kid to go with him. 
1 
The boy will befriend 
a stranger with his 
balloon. 
1 
We see the man 
observing him again. 
1 




The man has to leave 
and leaves little boy 
w/o an umbrella. 
1 
The boy will go to the 
old man with umbrella's 
house. 
1 
The boy is sending 
the balloon to an 
important person that 
he loves. 
1 
The boy finds his 
family. 
1 
The boy and man will sit 
and talk. 
1 
The boy will hand the 










Table 8 (continued). 
He'll say goodbye & 
run with his balloon 
to a building (home? 
a store?). 
1 
The man points 
somewhere indicating 
where he or the kid 
should go. 
1 
The boy and man 
will continue their 
conversation and 
hatch a plan so the 
boy can keep his 
balloon for the ride. 
1 
The boy gets on the 
bike. 
1 
The kid will thank the 
man for letting him 
under the umbrella and 
reach his destination. 
1 
The man who was 
taking notes will 
confront the boy. 
1 
-- -- 
The boy will find a way 
to keep the balloon with 
him all day long while 
doing all the other 
normal things he does 
every day. 
1 




The child starts climbing 
the stairs again. 





























Table 9 – Predictions and their frequency (f) at Probe 5 (Across/Across) for each 
level of Orientation. 
Situation Neutral Fine 
Prediction f Prediction f Prediction f 




The boy releases the 
balloon outside. 
11 
The boy releases the 
balloon outside. 
7 
The boy goes 
outside with his 
balloon. 
5 
The boy goes outside 
with his balloon. 
7 
The boy brings the 
balloon inside 
4 
The boy looks 
down onto the 
street. 
4 
The boy looks down 
onto the street. 
4 
The boy goes outside 
with his balloon. 
4 
The boy loses the 
balloon. 
2 
Kid ties balloon outside 
window. 
1 
The boy gives the 
balloon away to 
someone. 
2 
The boy runs. 2 
The boy will try to talk 
to the street vendor. 
1 The boy goes outside. 2 
The boy takes the 
balloon to school. 
2 
The lady reads the 
letter. 
1 
The boy interacts with 
the mailman. 
2 
The boy walks 
out onto the 
balcony. 
2 




more mail to people. 
1 
The boy yells out 
to the street seller. 
1 Plays with balloon. 1 
The little boy's balloon 
goes down to get 
whatever the man's 
selling. 
1 
The boy and the 
balloon are going 
to explore his 
house. 
1 
The mailman continues 
to handout mail. 
1 
The balloon explores 
the city. 
1 




The child will go & 
play with his balloon 
some more but 
something will happen 
to him/it. 
1 
The boy ties the 
balloon to the iron bars 
outside to prevent it 
from being seen by 
people in the room. 
1 
The boy will tie 
the balloon up & 
then go on 
another outing. 
1 
Someone (e.g. the 
mailman) will come 
knock on the boy's 
door. 
1 
The child will try to 
get rid of the balloon 
in some other way. 
1 
The boy hears the 
man and meets 
him. 
1   
The kid brings the 
balloon back to his 
house and his mother 





Table 9 (continued). 
-- -- -- -- 
The woman catches the 
kid with the balloon and 
scolds him. 
1 
-- -- -- -- 
The kid will let the 
balloon see the sun rise 
with him. 
1 
-- -- -- -- 
The boy will interact 






































Table 10 – Predictions and their frequency (f) at Probe 6 (Within/Within) for each 
level of Orientation. 
Situation Neutral Fine 
Prediction f Prediction f Prediction f 
The boy is not 
allowed on the 
bus. 
22 
The boy is not allowed on 
the bus. 
19 
The boy is not allowed 




boy as he rides 
the bus. 
4 
The balloon follows the 
boy as he rides the bus. 
6 
The balloon follows the 
boy as he rides the bus. 
4 
The boy gets 
on the bus 
with the 
balloon. 
1 The boy boards the bus. 3 The boy boards the bus. 2 
He is going to 
try to get on 
the bus. 
1 
The boy will leave the 
balloon on the bus. 
1 
The kid keeps going 
around town with the 
balloon for the rest of the 
day. 
1 
The boy tries 
to board the 




He will follow a similar 
routine to that in clip 1 but 
the balloon will be able to 
take care of itself better. 
1 
The boy is going to let 
go of the balloon after 




balloon on the 
bus and he 
continues to 
walk. 
1 -- -- 
The bus gate person 
doesn't allow the boy on, 
but he leaves the balloon 
so he can go. 
1 
-- -- -- -- 
















Table 11 – Predictions and their frequency (f) at Probe 7 (Within/Across) for each 
level of Orientation. 
Situation Neutral Fine 
Prediction f Prediction f Prediction f 
The balloon 
continues to 
follow the boy. 
1
0 
The boy gets off the bus 




The boy gets off the 
bus and reunites with 
the balloon. 
17 
The boy goes to 
school with the 
balloon. 
7 
The balloon continues 
to follow the boy. 
6 
The boy arrives at 
school. 
4 
The boy gets 




The balloon will have 













The boy gets off the 
bus. 
2 The bus stops. 1 
The balloon 
won't be able to 
keep up. 
1 
The boy gets off the bus 
near his school. 
2 
The balloon takes a 
short cut to beat the 
bus. 
1 
Boy will get off 
bus to check 
out market. 
1 
The boy will go to 
school and encounter 
the creepy man again. 
1 
Something bad will 
happen with the 
balloon. 
1 






on its own. 
1 
The trip continues and 
the people are 
astounded. 
1 
The balloon stops 
following the bus. 
1 
The boy will 
get off at stop 
near his home 
and show all 
his friends the 
balloon. 
1 
The child will arrive at 
a park. 
1 
The balloon and boy 
will reach their 
destinations but the 
balloon will start to 
separate from the 
boy. 
1 
The boy gets 
off the streetcar 
and the balloon 
runs away. 
1 
When he goes to school 
he will not need to give 
the balloon to that man 
to keep. 
1 The balloon gets lost. 1 
-- -- 
Someone will pop the 
balloon. 
1 -- -- 
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Table 11 (continued). 
-- -- 
Something will happen 
to the boy or balloon. 
1 -- -- 
-- -- 
The boy will now go to 
school without the 
balloon and the balloon 
will meet the by outside 
when school's over. 






































Table 12 – Predictions and their frequency (f) at Probe 8 (Across/Across) for each 
level of Orientation. 
Situation Neutral Fine 
Prediction f Prediction f Prediction f 
The man does not 
catch the balloon. 
1
5 
The man catches the balloon. 
5 
The man does not catch 
the balloon. 
12 
The man catches 
the balloon. 
5 
The man gives up trying to 
catch the balloon. 
5 





but the boy. 
3 
The balloon eludes everyone 
but the boy. 4 




to catch the 
balloon. 
2 
The man does not catch the 
balloon. 
4 
The balloon will find its 
way into the classroom. 
1 
The man tries to 
pop the balloon. 
2 
Children will try to catch the 
balloon. 
2 
People will come to try 
& catch the balloon but 
fail. Boy will get 
balloon after class. 
1 




The man continues trying to 
catch the balloon. 2 
The balloon leads the 




enters the class. 
1 
Everyone will want to balloon 
after school, but it will follow 
the boy. 
1 
The balloon would wait 
for the kids to come out 
and then let him catch 
itself. 
1 
The balloon finds 
its way to the boy. 
1 
The balloon will get lost from 
the boy. 
1 
The man won't get the 
balloon. The boy will 
leave and the balloon 
will follow him. 
1 
-- -- 
The balloon flies away from 
the school. 1 
The boy will leave 
school and the balloon 
will stay with him. 
1 
-- -- 
The balloon will get inside 
the facility. 
1 




Balloon finds some way to 
reunite with the boy. 
1 
The teacher is going to 
try to contain the 




The guy in black grabs and 
holds onto balloon for the 
boy. 





Table 12 (continued). 
-- -- 
The balloon will protect itself 
from rain (i.e. he won't need 
to put it under strangers' 
umbrellas). 
1 -- -- 
-- -- 
The balloon escapes yet 
again. 







































Table 13 – Predictions and their frequency (f) at Probe 9 (Within/Within) for each 
level of Orientation. 
Situation Neutral Fine 
Prediction f Prediction f Prediction f 
The balloon 
continues to follow 
the man until he 
frees the boy. 
8 
The balloon continues to 
follow the man. 
12 
The balloon continues to 
follow the man until he 
frees the boy. 
8 
The balloon 
continues to follow 
the man. 
5 
The balloon continues to 
follow the man until he 
frees the boy. 
7 
The balloon continues to 
follow the man. 
4 
The balloon will 
get the key to the 
door. 
3 
The man catches the 
balloon. 3 
The balloon will get the 
key to the door. 
4 
Other people will 
notice the balloon. 
2 
Children will try to catch 
the balloon. 
2 




returns to the boy. 
2 
The balloon will try to 
get the key and rescue 
the boy. 
1 Headmaster goes to lunch. 1 
Children will try to 
catch the balloon. 
2 
The man tries to get rid 
of the balloon. 
1 
He continues his attempts 
to catch the balloon. 
1 
The man catches 
the balloon. 
2 
The balloon continues to 
stalk the headmaster-like 
guy, but the guy never 
notices. 
1 The mom will get on a bus.  1 
The balloon 
continues to follow 
the man, but the 
man is unable to 
catch it. 
1 
Man goes into store/shop. 
1 
The kids try and grab the 
balloon. 
1 
Man in the coat 
turns suddenly and 
tries to grab the 
balloon again. 
1 
Balloon will get revenge 
on the man. 
1 
The balloon keeps agitating 
him, he attacks. 
1 
The man fetches 
the boy's mom. 
1 
He's trying to lose the 
balloon. 
1 
The man starts running to 
get away from the balloon. 
1 
Balloon will make 
man unlock the 
door. 
1 -- -- 
The balloon is now going 
to annoy the teacher for 
locking the kid in a room. 
1 
The balloon will 
somehow help the 
boy escape. 
1 -- -- 
The man gets annoyed with 
the balloon so he goes back 






Table 13 (continued). 
 
The man will be 
bothered during 
his outing & will 
resort to letting the 
boy out. 
1 -- -- 
The man goes into a 
building. 
1 
-- -- -- -- 
The balloon will get the 







































Table 14 – Predictions and their frequency (f) at Probe 10 (Within/Across) for each 
level of Orientation. 
Situation Neutral Fine 
Prediction f Prediction f Prediction f 
The men try to 
catch the balloon. 
7 
The men try to catch 
the balloon. 
10 
One of the men tries to 
catch the balloon. 
8 
The men talk 
about the balloon. 
4 
The men talk about 
the balloon. 
4 
The men try to catch the 
balloon. 
8 
The man will free 
the boy. 
3 
The balloon pesters 
the man. 
3 
The balloon directs the 
men back to the boy. 
3 
The men try to pop 
the balloon. 
3 
The men try to pop 
the balloon. 
3 
The balloon will get the 
key to the door. 
2 
The balloon 
pesters the men. 2 
The balloon reminds 
the man that the boy 
is locked away. 
2 
The men use the boy to 
get rid of the balloon. 
2 
The man leaves 





The man will free the 
boy. 
2 
The school teacher will 
walk back to the school. 
1 
The balloon is 
going to get the 
key. 
1 
They ignore the 
balloon. 
1 
The balloon goes back 
and unlocks the door for 
the boy. 
1 
The balloon spies 
on the faculty of 
the school. 
1 
The man tries to 
explain why the 
balloon follows him 
all the way. 
1 
Man plans to get 
balloon. 
1 





people will get 
caught. 
1 
The balloon will keep 
following the man. 
1 
The man will 
return the balloon 
to the boy. 
1 
Balloon finds some 
way to set the boy 
free. 
1 
The man will be 
confused about the 
balloon. 
1 
The older man 
tries to grab at the 
balloon. 
1 
Those two men are 
involved in some 
kind of conspiracy 
(not joking). 
1 
They are going to talk, 
but now the topic of the 
conversation will 
change to balloon. 
1 
The balloon will 
scare the man & 
make him run 
away. 
1 
The two men will 
come up with a plan 
to get rid of the 
annoying balloon. 
1 
The men find a way to 
catch the balloon, and 
maybe destroy it. 
1 
The two men talk 
to the boy. 




Table 14 (continued). 
 
The men talking 
will be distracted 
by the following 
balloon. 
1 -- -- -- -- 
They bring the 
balloon back to the 
boy to show it 
follows people. 
1 -- -- -- -- 




the balloon, gets 
boy out. 
































Table 15 – Predictions and their frequency (f) at Probe 11 (Across/Across) for each 
level of Orientation. 
Situation Neutral Fine 
Prediction f Prediction f Prediction f 
The boy finds the 
balloon. 
13 
The boy finds the 
balloon. 
13 
The boy finds the 
balloon. 
12 
The boy will 
continue searching 
for the balloon. 
5 
The boy chases the 
balloon. 
3 
The boy loses the 
balloon. 
5 
The boy loses the 
balloon. 
4 
The boy loses the 
balloon. 
3 
The boy will continue 
searching for the 
balloon. 
4 




The balloon follows 
the boy. 
2 
The balloon looks at 
mirrors. 
2 
The balloon is 
going to hide. 
1 
The boy will continue 
searching for the 
balloon. 
2 
He explores the market 
further. 
1 
The boy wants to 
buy the painting of 
the girl. 
1 
Balloon helps kid get 
the girl/picture. 
1 
Someone will attempt 
to steal the balloon and 
sell it. 
1 
The balloon wants 
to buy a mirror. 
1 
Boy will find 
something to buy. 
1 
I think the kid will 
leave the market. 
1 
Someone is going 
to catch the 
balloon and the 
boy will chase 
them. 
1 
Boy continues to 
explore the market. 
1 
The balloon will find a 
new owner. 
1 
The boy will find 
the balloon & 
scold it, since he 
talked to the 
balloon before. 
1 
The boy will ditch the 
balloon for a girl. 
1 
The boy and the 




continues to fly 
away and getting 
the attention of the 
crowd. 
1 
Someone else will 
take the balloon. 
1 
The balloon will lead 
the boy into a 
dangerous situation. 
1 
The balloon is 
going to help the 
little boy find the 
girl on the image. 
1 
The kid will be done 
browsing and be on 
his way (the balloon 
too). 
1 







Table 15 (continued). 
-- -- 
The boy will have to 
start following the 
balloon. 











































Table 16 – Predictions and their frequency (f) at Probe 12 (Within/Across) for each 
level of Orientation. 
Situation Neutral Fine 
Prediction f Prediction f Prediction f 
The boy and girl 
become friends. 
10 
The boy and girl 
become friends. 
8 
The boy and girl walk 
together. 
10 
The boy and girl 
walk together. 
8 
The boy and girl walk 
together. 
8 
The boy and girl 
become friends. 
7 
The boy and girl let 
go of their balloons. 
2 
The boy and girl 
interact with each 
other. 
3 
The boy and girl talk 
with each other. 
5 
The boy and girl 
play with each other. 
2 
The boy and girl 
spend time with each 
other. 
3 
The boy and girl play 
together. 
3 
The boy and girl talk 
with each other. 
2 
The boy and the girl 
go their separate ways. 
3 
The red balloon tries to 
find other balloons. 
2 
The boy and the girl 
will separate and 
walk away from 
each other with their 
balloons. 
1 
The boy and girl fall 
in love. 
2 
The two balloons start to 
ignore the children. 
1 
Both the children 
and balloons are 
interested in one 
another. 
1 
The boy gives the two 
balloons (Red Blue) 
back to the girl. 
1 
The children and the 
balloons will fall in 
love. 
1 
He will give blue 
balloon back to girl. 
1 
Gives the blue balloon 
back to the girl & he 
continues walking his 
way. 
1 
The kids will start going 
out. 
1 
Both balloons try to 
be together. 
1 
The girl will start to 
walk away. 
1 -- -- 
The 2 kids start to 
meet every day. 
1 -- -- -- -- 
The boy and the girl 
start hanging out 
together. 











Table 17 – Predictions and their frequency (f) at Probe 13 (Across/Across) for each 
level of Orientation. 
Situation Neutral Fine 
Prediction f Prediction f Prediction f 
The boy's 
mother puts the 
balloon outside. 
6 
The boys give up and 
leave. 
6 
The boys give up and 
leave. 
6 
The boys give up 
and leave. 
5 
The boy hides from 
the other boys. 
5 
The boy releases the 
balloon outside. 
3 
The boys try to 
steal the balloon 
another way. 
3 
The girl and the blue 
balloon arrive. 
3 
The boys continue trying 
to steal the balloon. 
2 
The boy hides 
from the other 
boys. 
2 
The boy closes the 
window. 
2 
The boys enter the boy's 
building. 
2 
The boy waits 
until it is safe to 
go outside again. 
2 
The boy shares his 
balloon. 
2 




continue to wait 
outside. 
2 
The boy's mother puts 
the balloon outside. 
2 
The group of boys will 
continue to harass the 
little boy. 
1 
He repeats this 
tomorrow. 
1 
The boy & balloon 
will always be 
friends.  
1 
The red balloon meets 
the blue balloon again. 
1 
The girl will 
show up. 
1 
A kid knocks on his 
door. 
1 
The kid's parents may 
still not approve of the 
balloon. 
1 
The boy goes to 
school the next 
day as well but 
all the other kids 
try to steal the 
balloon. 
1 
The boys will bully 
the boy would has 
balloons affections. 
1 
The neighbor wants to 
see the balloon, she 
knocks on the door. 
1 
The boy closes 
the windows. 
1 
The mob of kids try 
and take the blue 
balloon. 
1 
The group of kids will 
find the girl with the blue 
balloon. 
1 
The girl goes 
home with her 
balloon. 
1 
The boys around 
aren't going to see the 
balloon. 
1 
The boy, and balloon, 
goes to school the next 
day. 
1 
The boy will 
leave out of a 
back entrance & 
find the girl w/ 
the blue balloon. 
1 
It cuts to the next day, 
and the boy walks out 
with his balloon, but 
it’s even smaller. 
1 
Once the child sees that 
the older children has 
disappeared he will let 




Table 17 (continued). 
The boy closes 
the doors 
temporarily then 




kid & balloon. 
1 
This balloon would 
eventually get stolen. 
1 





The other children in 
the home will try to 
take the balloon. 
1 
Night comes, balloon 
wanders on its own. 
1 
The boy keeps 
the balloon in 
the house but it 
tries to escape. 
1 
Boy goes out again 
later. 
1 
The people trying to steal 
his balloon will soon 
want to be friends and 








The other boys will 
beat him up at school. 
1 
The boy will shut the 
door. 
1 
-- -- -- -- 
The woman scolds him 
for bringing the balloon 
inside. 
1 
-- -- -- -- 
The kids will fight over 
to get the balloon. 
1 
-- -- -- -- 
He hangs out with his 
balloon inside. 
1 
-- -- -- -- 





















Table 18 – Predictions and their frequency (f) at Probe 14 (Within/Within) for each 
level of Orientation. 
Situation Neutral Fine 
Prediction f Prediction f Prediction f 
The boy buys 
food. 
16 The boy buys food. 16 The boy buys food. 13 
The boy tries to 
buy food. 
5 
The boy finds that he 
has no money. 
6 
The boy finds that he 
has no money. 
6 
The boy finds 
that he has no 
money. 
3 
The boy will keep 
going on more 
adventures with the 
balloon. 
1 
The boy enters the 
bakery. 
3 
The boy uses the 
balloon to get 
food. 
2 
The boy will go inside 
the shop. 
1 
The boy tries to buy 
food. 
3 
The boy walks 
into the bakery, 




The boy takes one of 
the snacks. 
1 
The boy sees how 
much money he has. 
2 
The balloon and 
the boy are going 
to have lunch. 
1 
The balloon will cause 
issues in the bakery 
too. 
1 
The boy uses the 
balloon to get food. 
2 
The girl will 
show up. 
1 
He is checking if he 
has enough money to 
buy something. 
1 
The boy will go into 
the shop to buy a good 
and when he comes 
out his balloon will 
vanish. 
1 
The boy goes 
into the shop to 
buy something. 
1 
The boy will eat a 
pastry. The balloon 
will leave while this 
happens. 
1 -- -- 
-- -- 
The kid doesn't have 
enough money for the 
pastries so he trades 
the balloon. 
1 -- -- 
-- -- 
Kid won't have enough 
money, balloon will 
help. 






Table 19 – Predictions and their frequency (f) at Probe 15 (Within/Across) for each 
level of Orientation. 
Situation Neutral Fine 
Prediction f Prediction f Prediction f 
The boys catch up to 
the boy and the 
balloon. 
8 
The boys catch up to the 
boy and the balloon. 
8 
The boys catch up to 
the boy and the balloon. 
14 
The boy and balloon 
elude the boys. 
5 
The boy and balloon elude 
the boys. 
7 
The boy and balloon 
elude the boys. 
8 
The boy goes home 
with the balloon. 
4 
The boys keep searching for 
the boy and the balloon. 
7 
The boy and balloon 
hide from the boys. 
3 
The boys keep 
searching for the boy 
and the balloon. 
4 
The boy and balloon find 
the girl with the blue 
balloon. 
3 
The boys keep 
searching for the boy 
and the balloon. 
2 
The boy and balloon 
are helped by an adult. 
2 
The boys will chase the boy 
and the balloon until the 
balloon pops or the boy gets 
hurt. 
1 
The older boys will try 
to get the balloon. 
1 
The boy and balloon 
find the girl with the 
blue balloon. 
2 
The boy has the man help 
him hide the balloon. 
1 
In the fight over the 
balloon it pops. 
1 
The gang of boys will 
pop the balloon. 
1 
The boy will find a 
stranger's house that will let 
him in. 
1 
The boy will go back to 
his apartment. 
1 
The boy will give the 
balloon to the man of 
school to keep safely. 
1 
The boy will share his 
balloon with a few of the 
kids. 
1 -- -- 
The man draws 
suspicion on the 
children. 
1 
The boy hides and escapes 
the crowd of kids, or 
confronts them in a dead 
end and the girl with the 
blue balloon comes and 
protects the boy and the red 
balloon. 
1 -- -- 
Boy has to let balloon 
free to be free from 
children. 
1 -- -- -- -- 
The boys are going to 
catch the little boy and 
destroy his balloon. 






Table 20 – Predictions and their frequency (f) at Probe 16 (Across/Across) for each 
level of Orientation. 
Situation Neutral Fine 
Prediction f Prediction f Prediction f 




The balloon is destroyed. 13 The balloon is destroyed. 15 
The boy becomes 




The boy becomes upset about 
losing the balloon. 
4 
The boy becomes upset 
about losing the balloon. 
3 
The girl with the blue 
balloon comforts the 
boy. 
2 The boy retrieves the balloon. 4 
The boy tries to save the 
balloon. 
3 
The owner of the 
balloon (boy) will run 
over to the shrinking 
balloon. 
1 
The girl with the blue balloon 
appears. 
2 
A child who is not the 
main boy will come pick 
up the balloon. 
1 
The boys will run 
away. 
1 
The balloon will stay on the 
ground. 
1 
The boy leaves the 
balloon behind and 
returns home. 
1 
The boy goes to the 
balloon, saddened, and 
tries to "revive" it. 
1 
The balloon shrivels and the 
boys turn on the one boy. 
1 
A dog will save the 
balloon and the child. 
1 
The balloon survives 
and eaves the boy so 
he can be safe. 
1 
The balloon then doesn't act 
like a man. It doesn't play 
with the boy later. 
1 
The boy suddenly 
acknowledges that the 
balloon is "dead.” 
1 
The balloon will fix its 
hole by itself. 
1 
Balloon, dies, kid will take 
revenge. 
1 
The child is going to run 
to it and pick it up. 
1 
The dog runs in and 
chases the older boys 
away. 
1 
The dog will come and pop 
the balloon. 
1 
The girl with the blue 
balloon would save the 
boy, because the blue 




The balloon "dies" and needs 
the help of the blue balloon to 
come back to life. 
1 
The balloon will lay 
down on the ground and 
the boys will disperse. 
1 
-- -- 
The kids walk over to it and 
mourn. 
1 
The grown up kid comes 
back and finds the 
balloon. 
1 
-- -- -- -- 
The boy will come take 








Table 21 – Predictions and their frequency (f) at Probe 17 (Within/Within) for each 
level of Orientation. 
Situation Neutral Fine 
Prediction f Prediction f Prediction f 
The balloons go to 
where the boy and 
his balloon are. 
20 
The balloons go to where the 
boy and his balloon are. 
21 
The balloons go to 





retaliate against the 
boys. 
6 
The balloons retaliate 
against the boys. 
3 
The balloons rescue the 
boy. 
3 
The balloons are 
going to save the 
boy. 
1 
The balloons continue to 
float. 
2 
The balloons retaliate 
against the boys. 
2 
Boy sees balloon 
spirit is not dead, its 
everywhere. 
1 
The balloons bind together 
to revive their fallen 
comrade. 
1 
The group of balloons 
gather over the ground 
where the mean boys 
and the kid are. 
1 
The boy will see all 
of these balloons and 
find a new friend. 
1 
Balloon boy cheers up in a 
bittersweet way after seeing 
all those balloons. 
1 
All the balloons will 
float up in the sky until 
they disappear. 
1 
All other balloons 
are going to gather 
together. 
1 
The balloon survives escape 
to freedom. 
1 




The balloons will mourn for 
their fallen comrade. 
1 




















Table 22 – Predictions and their frequency (f) at Probe 18 (Within/Within) for each 
level of Orientation. 
Situation Neutral Fine 
Prediction f Prediction f Prediction f 
The balloons carry 
the boy home. 
13 
The balloons carry the boy 
home. 
7 
The balloons carry the 
boy home. 
7 




The boys will see the boy 
flying with the balloons. 
5 
The boy and the 
balloons continue flying. 
4 
The boys will see 
the boy flying with 
the balloons. 
3 
The boy and the balloons 
fly around the city. 
4 
The balloons carry the 
boy away. 
3 
The balloons carry 
the boy to the girl. 
2 
The boy and the balloons 
fly to heaven. 
2 
The balloons take him to 
the boys. 
3 
The boy and the 
balloons fly 
around the city. 
2 The movie ends. 2 The movie ends. 3 
The boy lives 
happily ever after. 
2 
All the balloons will belong 
to the boy. 
1 
The balloons set the boy 
down on the ground. 
2 
Picture will fade to 
black as boy floats 
away. 
1 
The kid flies away with the 
balloons to the school. 
1 
The boys will see the 
boy flying with the 
balloons. 
2 
The balloons show 
their appreciation 
but decide to go 
back from where 
they came. 
1 
The balloons are going to 
take the boy to the group of 
kids that bullied him. 
1 
The boy floats over the 
mob of kids. 
1 
-- -- 
The boy will be 
happy/move on from his 
balloon's death. 
1 




The boy will be set down 
gently. 
1 
The balloons will carry 
the boy to the road and 




Boy eventually lands 
somewhere, taking a 
balloon with him, but gives 
it up. 
1 




The boy will land and the 
balloons will return to their 
owners. 
1 Kid could fly to places 1 
-- -- 
Kid happy to be free and 
away from all evils of his 
life. 
1 





Table 22 (continued). 
-- -- 
The balloons will take him 
to the girl. 
1 -- -- 
-- -- 
The boy will find a human 
friend knowing the balloon 
will always be with him. 


















APPENDIX B: ANALYSES OF HIT AND FALSE ALARM RATES 
B.1 Hit Rates 
Untransformed hit rates were analyzed with a 3 x 3 mixed ANOVA with Probe 
Type (Within/Within, Within/Across, Across/Across) as a within-subjects factor and 
Orientation (Situation, Neutral, Fine) as a between-subjects factor. This analysis revealed 
a significant main effect of Probe Type, F(2, 162) = 29.53, p < .001, η2partial = .27, but no 
significant effect of Orientation, F(2, 81) = .60, p = .55, η2partial = .02, nor interaction 
between Probe Type and Orientation, F(4, 162) = 1.89, p = .11, η2partial = .05. 
Trend analysis of Probe Type indicated a significant linear, F(1, 81) = 51.97, p < 
.001, η2partial = .39, but not a significant quadratic trend, F(1, 81) = 1.53, p = .22, η
2
partial = 
.02. Thus, participant’s hit rates were highest when within a situation and fine event 
(Within/Within; M = .85, SE = 0.02), worse when nearing the end of a fine event during 
an ongoing situation (Within/Across; M = .75, SE = 0.02), and were lowest when nearing 
the end of both a fine event and situation (Across/Across; M = .56, SE = 0.03). 
B.2 False Alarm Rates 
Untransformed false alarm rates were analyzed with a 3 x 3 mixed ANOVA with 
Probe Type (Within/Within, Within/Across, Across/Across) as a within-subjects factor 
and Orientation (Situation, Neutral, Fine) as a between-subjects factor. This analysis 
revealed a significant main effect of Probe Type, F(2, 162) = 3.72, p = .03, η2partial = .04, 
but no significant effect of Orientation, F(2, 81) = 0.82, p = .44, η2partial = .02, nor 
interaction between Probe Type and Orientation, F(4, 162) = 0.71, p = .59, η2partial = .02. 
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Trend analysis of Probe Type indicated a significant linear, F(1, 81) = 5.58, p = 
.02, η2partial = .06, but not a significant quadratic trend, F(1, 81) = 1.19, p = .28, η
2
partial = 
.02. Thus, participant’s false alarm rates were highest when within a situation and fine 
event (Within/Within; M = .59, SE = 0.03), lower when nearing the end of a fine event 
during an ongoing situation (Within/Across; M = .51, SE = 0.03), and were lowest when 
















APPENDIX C: REPRODUCTION OF MUMMA & DURSO (IN REVISION) 
C.1 Experiment 1 
The goals of Experiment 1 were 1) to collect and establish the reliability of 
normative ratings of situations characteristics, which were used to predict judgments of 
situation boundaries in Experiment 2, and 2) to test the dynamic relationship between 
changes in situation cues and situation characteristics. The latter is a stronger test of the 
theoretical relationship between cues and characteristics (i.e., that situation characteristics 
are interpretations or evaluations of the meaning of a constellation of situation cues), for 
which evidence has only been provided using static descriptions of situations 
(Rauthmann et al., 2014). To this end, participants continuously rated a narrative feature 
film (The Red Balloon; Lamorisse, 1956) with respect to one of eight different situation 
characteristics (i.e., “the Situational Eight DIAMONDS”; Rauthmann et al., 2014). The 
film was coded by Zacks et al. (2009) for changes in situation cues. 
C.1.1 Method 
C.1.1.1 Participants 
One hundred individuals from the Georgia Institute of Technology participated in 
partial fulfillment of a research familiarization requirement. Data from one subject was 
excluded for having no sound during the film and data from two subjects were excluded 
after each reported that they had seen the film before. The average age of the remaining 
97 participants was 20.06 years (SD = 2.15), 48 of whom were male. A different set of 12 




The stimulus in the present study was the cinematic film, The Red Balloon 
(Lamorisse, 1956), which has been used in previous studies on event segmentation 
(Kurby, Asiala, & Mills, 2014; Zacks et al., 2009; Zacks et al., 2010). The film is about a 
young boy who befriends a sentient balloon that attempts to follow the boy throughout 
his daily activities (e.g., riding the bus, going to school, and going to church). This film 
was chosen because it includes a variety of changes in situation cues, unfolds 
continuously in time, has minimal dialogue, and is largely unfamiliar to the participant 
population. The film was approximately 33 minutes long and was divided into four clips, 
lasting 7.7, 7.8, 7.4, and 10 minutes, respectively (Zacks et al., 2009). 
The Red Balloon was previously coded, frame by frame, by Zacks et al. (2009) for 
changes in characters (i.e., whenever a different character or characters, including 
nonhuman animate characters, become the focus of action), interactions between 
characters (e.g., touching, gesturing, or talking), interactions between characters and 
objects (e.g., picking up or putting down an object), spatial location (e.g., changes in 
location or a character’s direction of motion), character goals (i.e., whenever a character 
performed an action associated with a goal that was different from the goal in the 
previous frame), and causality (i.e., whenever activity in a frame could not be explained 
by something in a previous frame). Lastly, cuts (i.e., when two continuous film shots 
abut) were also coded. Correlations among these variables are reported elsewhere (Zacks 




After providing informed consent, participants were randomly assigned to rate the 
film with respect to only one of the eight DIAMONDS dimensions (Rauthmann et al., 
2014). These characteristics were derived from the factor analysis of ratings from a large 
and diverse sample of experienced situations (i.e., by people in America and throughout 
Europe and Asia) and are inclusive of many previous taxonomies of situation 
characteristics, have good inter-rater reliability, and are tied to a variety of situational 
cues. The DIAMONDS dimensions comprise Duty (e.g., “Does work need to be done?”), 
Intellect (e.g., “Is deep cognitive information processing relevant?”), Adversity (e.g., “Is 
someone under threat?), Mating (e.g., “Is the situation erotically charged?”), pOsitivity 
(e.g., “Is the situation enjoyable?”), Negativity (e.g., “Could the situation turn 
negative?”), Deception (e.g., “Is mistrust an issue?”), and Sociality (e.g., “Is meaningful 
social interaction and relationship building possible?”; Rauthmann & Sherman, 2016). 
Participants were seated approximately 61 centimeters away from an 81-
centimeter diagonal computer screen. Videos were presented using CARMA software 
(Girard, 2014), which collects continuous ratings of audiovisual stimuli at 1-second 
intervals. During the experiment, participants indicated the extent to which they felt the 
current situation contained one of the DIAMONDS dimensions: either Duty (i.e., “Work, 
tasks, or duties”), Intellect (i.e., “Intellectual, aesthetic, profound things”), Adversity (i.e., 
“Threat, accusation, criticism”), Mating (i.e., “Romance, sexuality, love”), pOsitivity 
(i.e., “Positive, pleasant, nice things”), Negativity (i.e., “Negative things, unpleasant 
things, bad feelings”), Deception (i.e., “Deceit, lie, dishonesty”), or Sociality (i.e., 
“Communication, interaction, social relationships”). Participants were told that “The 
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‘current situation’ is whatever you think the current circumstances or state of affairs in 
the film is.” 
Participants used a joystick to indicate their response on a 7-point scale, which 
ranged from “Not at All” (1) to “Extremely” (7). The 7-point scale and characteristic-
nouns came from the S8-II (Rauthmann & Sherman, 2016), which is a validated brief 
measure of the DIAMONDS dimensions. Participants rated the film by moving the 
joystick away from them as the dimension of interest increased (i.e., towards 
“Extremely”) and toward them as it diminished (i.e., towards “Not at All”). The rating 
scale and the participant’s current position on the scale were displayed on the screen 
adjacent to the film. Participants could refer to a printed copy of the nouns corresponding 
to their assigned characteristic throughout the experimental task. After rating each clip, 
participants took a brief break before continuing to the next of the four clips, before 
which task instructions were repeated. 
Before rating The Red Balloon, a 4.4-minute-long clip from North by Northwest 
(Hitchcock, 1959) was used for practice, during which participants were instructed to rate 
the extent to which the current situation contains “Interesting, stimulating, or engaging 
things.” 
C.1.2 Results and Discussion 
C.1.2.1 Ratings of Characteristics  
Inter-rater reliability of the ratings of each situation characteristic was assessed 
with intraclass correlations. For each participant, ratings were averaged over every five 
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contiguous 1-second time bins. 5-second time bins were used to be consistent with 
previous analyses of segmentation behavior while viewing The Red Balloon (Kurby et al., 
2014; Zacks et al., 2009; Zacks et al., 2010). Because the present study was interested in 
how changes in characteristics are perceived normatively (i.e., on average), a two-way 
random-average-measures consistency model was obtained for each characteristic 
(ICC[C,k]; McGraw & Wong, 1996). Table 23 provides the intraclass correlation 
coefficients and 95% confidence intervals for each of the eight DIAMONDS dimensions, 
all of which correspond to excellent reliability (Cicchetti, 1994). Thus, consistency was 
high among participants continuously rating the same situation characteristic throughout 
the film. 
 
Table 23 – Intraclass correlation coefficients and 95% confidence intervals for 





Duty 13 .80*** [.77, .83] 
Intellect 12 .92*** [.91, .94] 
Adversity 12 .91*** [.90, .92] 
Mating 12 .83*** [.81, .86] 
pOsitivity 12 .94*** [.93, .95] 
Negativity 12 .90*** [.88, .91] 
Deception 12 .78*** [.74, .81] 
Sociality 12 .91*** [.90, .92] 
Note. n = number of raters. CI = confidence interval.  
*** p < .001 
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C.1.2.2 Characteristic-Change  
To measure the momentary change in each characteristic throughout the film, the 
absolute value of the mathematical derivative of the rating value was approximated for 
each 1-second time bin, then averaged over each successive five bins. Thus, an average 
derivative of zero indicates that no change in a characteristic occurred in those 5 seconds, 
whereas bins containing a non-zero average derivative indicate the extent to which 
change in a characteristic did occur. For each situation characteristic, the mean derivative 
for each subject (averaged over all time bins) was computed and collectively compared to 
zero using a one-sample t-test. Table 24 indicates the grand mean of the derivative for 
each situation characteristic, all of which were significantly greater than zero, indicating 
that no characteristic remained unchanged throughout the film 
 
Table 24 – Average derivative and standard error of DIAMONDS dimensions. 
DIAMONDS Mean Derivative SE 
Duty 0.11** 0.02 
Intellect 0.08*** 0.01 
Adversity 0.05*** 0.01 
Mating 0.04** 0.01 
pOsitivity 0.08*** 0.01 
Negativity 0.06*** 0.01 
Deception 0.09*** 0.02 
Sociality 0.15*** 0.01 




C.1.2.3 Predicting Changes in Characteristics 
A major goal of Experiment 1 was to determine whether changes in situation cues 
were generally predictive of changes in characteristics. In the present studies, situation 
cues refer to characters (Who?), their interactions with other characters and objects 
(What?), their motivations (i.e., causes of activity, such as goals; Why?), and space 
(Where?). To predict changes in characteristics (i.e., the eight DIAMONDS dimensions) 
from cuts and changes in these cues, eight separate linear mixed models were built using 
the lme4 package (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015) in R statistical software (R 
Core Team, 2013). The statistical significance of fixed effects was obtained using the 
lmerTest package (Kuznetsova, Brockhoff, & Christensen, 2015), which uses 
Satterthwaite’s approximation for degrees of freedom. Each model included seven fixed 
effects (i.e., one binary predictor variable coding for the presence of a cut in each time 
bin and one binary predictor for each of the six cues coding for a change in that cue) and 
a random intercept for participants to account for the fact that repeated observations were 
made on each participant. 
Table 25 shows the coefficients for the seven predictor variables for each of the 
eight DIAMONDS dimensions. Indeed, changes in all eight DIAMONDS dimensions 
were positively related to changes in at least one of the six situation cues. In particular, 
participants perceived changes in all of the DIAMONDS dimensions when character(s) 
changed. That changes in characters were predictive of changes in all eight characteristics 
is consistent with the idea that characters are fundamental to situation model construction 
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(Bailey et al., 2017; Radvansky & Dijkstra, 2007; Thierrault, Rinck, & Zwaan, 2006; 
Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998). 
 
Table 25 – Fixed effects coefficients and significance of cuts and changes in cues in 
predicting changes in characteristics. 
  Situation Cues 







Cause Goal Space 
Duty 0.009 0.029*** 0.020** 0.013 0.007 -0.013 0.006 
Intellect -0.008 0.019*** -0.003 0.005 0.012* -0.005 0.007 
Adversity -0.006 0.026*** 0.010* 0.004 0.008 -0.007 0.002 
Mating 0.001 0.008* -0.003 0.004 0.008* 0.007 0.002 




0.034*** 0.009 0.008 0.006 -0.004 0.010* 
Deception -0.004 0.033*** 0.010 0.010 0.004 -0.013 0.018** 
Sociality -0.010 0.094*** 0.038*** 0.023* 0.004 -0.011 0.009 
a“Character with Character” means changes in physical interactions between characters. 
b“Character with Object” means physical interactions between characters and objects.            
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
 
Apart from changes in characters, changes in other situation cues occasionally 
predicted changes in multiple characteristics; for example, changes in the interactions 
between characters were positively related to changes in Duty, Adversity, pOsitivity, and 
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Sociality. In short, situation characteristics are at least partly associated with situation 
cues, as many have theorized (Endler, 1981; Rauthmann et al., 2015) but have not 
demonstrated with dynamic stimuli. 
C.2 Experiment 2 
Having found support for the hypothesis that situation characteristics are 
dynamically tied to a variety of situation cues in Experiment 1, the goal of Experiment 2 
was to test two competing perspectives on how changes in cues and characteristics might 
correspond to the perception of a new situation beginning – the objectivist and 
subjectivist perspectives. 
The objectivist perspective emphasizes the role of the external features of 
situations in influencing behavior. For example, much of experimental social psychology 
considers manipulation of situation cues sufficient to create different situations (e.g., by 
varying who is present, such as the number of bystanders; Horstmann, Rauthmann, & 
Sherman, 2017). Indeed, judgments about when situations change during narrative 
stories, film, or video games correspond to changes in characters (“Who?”; Magliano, 
Kopp, McNerny, Radvansky, & Zacks, 2012; Magliano, Radvansky, Forsythe, & 
Copeland, 2014), their goals (“Why?”; Magliano et al., 2012; Magliano et al., 2014; 
Magliano, Taylor, & Kim, 2005), spatial-temporal framework (“When?/Where?”; 
Magliano et al., 2001; Magliano et al., 2011; Magliano et al., 2014), and events 
(“What?”; Magliano et al., 2012). Thus, the objectivist tradition would predict that 
changes in situation cues will leave little variance in situation-change judgments to be 
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accounted for by changes in situation characteristics (e.g., the situation’s positivity or 
adversity). 
The subjectivist perspective emphasizes the role of the phenomenological aspects 
of situations in influencing behavior, arguing that people ultimately react to the 
characteristics or qualities of situations, not their situation cues per se (Edwards & 
Templeton, 2005; Endler, 1981). For example, recent taxonomies of situation 
characteristics (Parrigon et al., 2017; Sherman, Rauthmann, Brown, Serfass, & Jones, 
2015; Rauthmann et al., 2014) predict the behaviors of people in situations from the 
situation’s characteristics in conceptually meaningful ways (e.g., situations perceived to 
be “important” tend to elicit conscientious behavior; Parrigon et al. 2017). Thus, the 
subjectivist perspective would predict that changes in situation characteristics should 
leave little variance in situation-change judgments to be accounted for by changes in 
situation cues. 
Lastly, if changes in situation characteristics are at all predictive of situation-
change judgments, then situation model updating effects should be observed. 
Specifically, The Event Indexing Model (Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998) predicts that the 
more a situation changes, the greater the probability of perceiving that a new situation has 
begun (i.e., the “additivity hypothesis”; Magliano et al., 2001; Rinck & Weber, 2003; 
Zacks et al., 2009; Zwaan et al., 1995; Zwaan et al., 1998; Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998). 
Thus, the additivity hypothesis predicts that the more situation characteristics are 
changing at any given moment in time, the greater the probability that one will perceive 





Fifty-seven additional participants from the Georgia Institute of Technology 
participated in partial fulfillment of a research familiarization requirement or for pay. 
Data for one participant was excluded because of an audio malfunction throughout the 
film. The remaining 56 participants (25 male) had a mean age of 20.45 years (SD = 2.41). 
C.2.1.2 Procedure 
After providing informed consent, participants were seated approximately 2 feet 
away from a 32” inch diagonal computer screen. Stimuli were presented with PsychoPy 
(Pierce, 2007). To measure the perception of situation-change, a modified version of an 
event-marking paradigm was used (Newtson, 1973; Zacks, Tversky, & Iyer, 2001). 
Typically, participants are instructed to parse activity into either the smallest or largest 
units that are natural and meaningful to them (i.e., fine and coarse segmentation, 
respectively; Newtson, 1973; Zacks et al., 2001). In the present study, participants were 
instructed to press the spacebar every time they felt that a new situation had begun. The 
same practice clip from Experiment 1 was used for practicing the segmentation task in 
Experiment 2. The precise moment that the spacebar was pressed each time during the 
film was recorded and was later assigned to the 1-second time bin in which it occurred. 
C.2.2 Results and Discussion 
C.2.2.1 Situation Boundaries 
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The mean number of situation boundaries identified during The Red Balloon was 
75.79 (SE = 6.06), with a median of 62. To measure the extent of agreement on the 
boundaries between situations, a “segmentation norm” was created by calculating the 
proportion of participants who identified a situation boundary in each time bin (Figure 1). 
Next, a point-biserial correlation was computed between each participant’s (binary) 
segmentation data and the segmentation norm (Kurby & Zacks, 2011). The resulting 
correlation coefficients (𝑟 ̅ = .381, SE = 0.02) were significantly larger than zero, t(55) = 
24.16, p < .001. 
C.2.2.2 Predicting Situation Boundaries 
To predict situation boundary judgments, a logistic mixed-effects model was 
created using the lme4 package (Bates et al., 2015) in R statistical software. A full model 
was constructed, which comprised a binary predictor for cuts, six binary predictors for 
changes in each of the six situation cues, eight continuous predictors for changes in each 
of the eight situation characteristics, and a random intercept for participants to account 
for the fact that repeated observations were made on each participant. A normative 
measure of how much each of the eight DIAMONDS dimensions were changing in each 
time bin was computed as follows: the absolute value of the derivative of a participant’s 
rating of a characteristic was calculated for each 1-second time bin and averaged over 
each successive five time bins, and then that value was averaged with those of other 
participants rating that characteristic for each of the 5-second time bins. All continuous 
predictors were standardized prior to analysis. 
141 
 
Regarding the competing hypotheses of the objectivist and subjectivist 
perspectives, log-likelihood ratio tests were performed to determine whether changes in 
cues could account for additional variance beyond that accounted for by changes in 
characteristics (and vice versa). To this end, two reduced models were created from the 
full model described previously - one without predictors for cues and one without 
predictors for characteristics. Regarding the contributions of changes in cues and 
characteristics in predicting situation boundary judgments, both reduced models fit the 
data significantly worse than the full model (Table 26), suggesting that changes in 
situation cues and situation characteristics account for unique variance in situation 
boundary judgments. 
 
Table 26 – Logistic mixed-effect models for situation boundary judgments and log-




χ2 (df) p 
Full 
Situation Change = Cuts + Cues + 
Characteristics 
-9353.7 – – 
Reduceda  Situation Change = Cuts + Cues -9513.6 319.63 (8) < .001*** 
Reducedb 
Situation Change = Cuts + 
Characteristics 
-9633.5 559.52 (6) < .001*** 
aWhen compared to full model, assesses contribution of changes in characteristics to 
model fit.                                                                                                                           
bWhen compared to full model, assesses contribution of changes in cues to model fit.               




In the full model (Table 27), the likelihood of identifying a situation boundary 
increased with changes in cues (i.e., characters, their interactions with other characters or 
objects, causality, and space) and characteristics (i.e., Duty, Intellect, pOsitivity, 
Negativity, Deception, and Sociality). It is notable that changes in Duty, pOsitivity, 
Negativity, and Sociality were predictive of situation boundaries as these characteristics 
are among the most prominent and replicable in the literature on situational taxonomies 
(Rauthmann, 2015). Separately, the presence of a cut also increased the likelihood of 
perceiving a situation boundary, which differs from previous analyses of The Red 
Balloon (Kurby et al., 2014; Zacks et al., 2009; Zacks et al., 2010), where cuts were 
mostly negatively associated with the identification of fine and coarse-grained event 
boundaries. Even in the reduced model without situation characteristics, cuts were 
positively associated with (Odds ratio = 1.10; z = 2.17, p = .03). Thus, cuts may have a 
different effect on the perception of situation boundaries than on the perception of event 
boundaries (i.e., the smallest or largest meaningful units of activity). In short, the results 
of Experiment 2 suggest a compromise between the objectivist and subjectivist 
perspectives – changes in situation cues and characteristics are both important for 







Table 27 – Odds ratios and significance of cuts, cue-changes, and characteristic-
changes in predicting situation boundaries. 
Predictors Odds Ratio z p 
Cuts 1.12 2.40 0.017* 
Situation Cues    
   Character 1.53 9.29 < 0.001*** 
   Character with Charactera 1.45 7.44 < 0.001*** 
   Character with Objectb 1.23 3.77 < 0.001*** 
   Cause 1.50 8.56 < 0.001*** 
   Goal 1.05 0.95 0.342 
   Space 1.14 2.86 0.004** 
DIAMONDS    
   Duty 1.13 6.45 < 0.001*** 
   Intellect 1.12 5.36 < 0.001*** 
   Adversity 1.01 0.65 0.517 
   Mating 1.02 1.00 0.319 
   pOsitivity 1.10 4.10 < 0.001*** 
   Negativity 1.15 5.90 < 0.001*** 
   Deception 1.04 2.02 0.043* 
   Sociality 1.08 3.62 < 0.001*** 
a“Character with Character” means changes in physical interactions between characters. 
b“Character with Object” means physical interactions between characters and object.                                                             







C.2.2.3 Additivity Hypothesis 
That changes in situation characteristics predict situation boundaries 
independently of changes in situation cues suggests that characteristics constitute 
meaningful facets of situation models. To test the additivity hypothesis (i.e., the more that 
characteristics are changing in any given moment, the greater the probability of 
perceiving that a new situation is beginning), two new predictor variables were created 
that summed the number of changes in all six situation cues and average derivatives in all 
situation characteristics in each time bin, respectively. All continuous predictors were 
mean-centered prior to analysis. Cuts (Odds ratio = 1.20, z = 4.71, p < .001), total number 
of changes in cues (Odds ratio = 1.36, z = 23.89, p < .001), and total amount of change in 
characteristics (Odds ratio = 2.23, z = 18.50, p < .001) each increased the likelihood of 
identifying a situation boundary. Thus, not only did the present study replicate the 
additive effects of changes in situation cues on the probability of identifying a situation 
boundary, it also suggests that the additive effect of changes in characteristics manifest 
independently of the additive effect of changes in cues. 
C.2.2.4 Fine and Coarse Segmentation 
We determined whether changes in situation cues and characteristics are also 
related to event boundaries obtained under more traditional segmentation instructions 
(i.e., segmenting an activity into either the largest or smallest units that are natural and 
meaningful; Newtson, 1973). To this end, we obtained and predicted fine and coarse-
grained segmentation from a previous study using The Red Balloon (Kurby et al., 2014) 
using exactly the same statistical models from Experiment 2. The results of these 
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analyses (Tables 28 and 29 for fine- and coarse-event boundaries, respectively) 
collectively suggest that changes in situation cues and characteristics independently 
increase the likelihood of perceiving any kind event boundary (i.e., coarse, situation, or 
fine). 
Table 28 – Odds ratios and significance of cuts, cue-changes, and characteristic-
changes in predicting fine-event boundaries. 
Predictors Odds Ratio z p 
Cuts 0.98 -0.38 0.702 
Situation Cues    
   Character 1.22 4.12 < 0.001*** 
   Character with Charactera 1.16 2.66 0.008** 
   Character with Objectb 1.39 5.59 < 0.001*** 
   Cause 1.02 0.31 0.759 
   Goal 1.06 1.06 0.290 
   Space 1.37 6.61 < 0.001*** 
DIAMONDS    
   Duty 1.12 5.37 < 0.001*** 
   Intellect 1.06 2.75 0.006** 
   Adversity 1.09 3.43 0.006** 
   Mating 1.11 4.65 < 0.001*** 
   pOsitivity 1.06 2.32 0.021* 
   Negativity 1.09 3.24 < 0.001*** 
   Deception 1.03 1.36 0.175 
   Sociality 1.08 3.21 < 0.001*** 
a“Character with Character” means changes in physical interactions between characters. 
b“Character with Object” means physical interactions between characters and object.                                                             
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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Table 29 – Odds ratios, significance of cuts, cue-changes, and characteristic-changes 
in predicting coarse-event boundaries. 
Predictors Odds Ratio z p 
Cuts 0.84 -2.59 0.010* 
Situation Cues    
   Character 1.54 6.43 < 0.001*** 
   Character with Charactera 1.35 4.17 < 0.001*** 
   Character with Objectb 1.35 5.02 < 0.001*** 
   Cause 1.47 3.47 < 0.001*** 
   Goal 1.27 2.60 0.009** 
   Space 1.39 4.69 < 0.001*** 
DIAMONDS    
   Duty 1.14 4.83 < 0.001*** 
   Intellect 1.21 6.79 < 0.001*** 
   Adversity 1.08 2.35 0.019* 
   Mating 1.03 1.03 0.301 
   pOsitivity 1.07 1.99 0.047* 
   Negativity 1.10 2.94 0.003** 
   Deception 0.99 -0.21 0.834 
   Sociality 1.06 1.80 0.072 
a“Character with Character” means changes in physical interactions between characters. 
b“Character with Object” means physical interactions between characters and object.                                                             
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